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Abstract
This thesis examines theoretically the impact of corruption and/or seignior-
age on some of the main macroeconomic variables (such as output, public
spending and ination rates) and on central bank conservativeness. This
thesis is divided into four chapters.
Chapter 1 is devoted to introduce the issues discussed in this thesis,
to do a review of the literature and to present the principal ndings of
the following chapters.
In the second chapter, I analyse how corruption and seigniorage a¤ect
output and ination rates, in contexts where there are a government and
an independent central bank. I nd under which conditions corruption
has a positive (negative) impact on output and ination rates. I also
show under which conditions the ination rate increases (decreases) as
the degree of seigniorage increases. Finally, I obtain that seigniorage
always has a positive e¤ect on output.
In the third chapter, I analyse how conservative should an indepen-
dent central bank be in an economy with corruption and seigniorage.
I propose a new indicator of the degree of conservativeness of an inde-
pendent central bank and then I characterise its optimal value. I show
that, when the governments preferences represent those of the society,
the central bank has to be more conservative than the government, ex-
cept with complete corruption. In this particular case, the central bank
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should be as conservative as the government. Further, I obtain that the
relationship between corruption and the optimal relative degree of con-
servativeness of the central bank is a¤ected by the volatility of supply
shocks. Finally, I nd that if seigniorage decreases, the central bank
should be more conservative.
In the fourth chapter, I explore the e¤ects of corruption in a mone-
tary union with a common central bank and two asymmetric countries.
Country 1 has a corrupt government while country 2 does not. Within
this framework, I determine under which conditions corruption a¤ects
output, public spending and ination rates and I obtain that it depends
on how far the government of country 1 is concerned about stabilising
its public spending. I also determine under which conditions corruption
in country 1 generates a negative e¤ect on country 2. In such a case, I
investigate how country 1 could compensate country 2 for the negative
externality.
Finally, concluding remarks and several extensions for future research
are presented in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Corruption is capturing a lot of attention around the world. In May 2015
US prosecutors disclosed cases of corruption by FIFA (Fédération Inter-
nationale de Football Association) o¢ cials and associates. In July 2015,
Romanian prosecutors indicted the prime minister as part of a corrup-
tion investigation. At the same time, thousands of protesters marched in
Guatemala City demanding the resignation of the countrys corruption-
plagued president. Thus, corruption is a particular feature prevalent
in many economies whose pervasiveness reaches many spheres, both in
developed and developing countries. According to the corruption percep-
tion index from Transparency International, in 2014, the global average
score was 43 and the European Monetary Union average score was 66.1
The concept of seigniorage refers to the di¤erence between the face
value of a note or coin and its costs of production and mintage (Buiter,
2007). Developing countries tend to have more ine¢ cient institutions
than developed countries. Therefore, developing countries rely more on
getting nance through seigniorage revenues and less through tax rev-
enues. Gros (2004) exposes that seigniorage represents less than one-half
of 1 per cent of government revenues for the Euro Area. This author
points out that low independence of the central bank, high seigniorage
and high regime instability are likely to appear together. Vergote et al.
1On a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean).
1
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1. Introduction 2
(2010) show that seigniorage income is a reliable income in the long run
for the European Central Bank and its distribution to all the Member
States of the Eurozone depends on their relative weight on GDP in the
Euro Area. Sotiropoulos et al. (2014) discuss the sovereign debt in the
Euro Area. They present several alternative scenarios to suspend the
debt burden for ve years and they estimate that if the average of the
Euro Area is stabilised above the level of interest rates, in the very long
run the losses of the European Central Bank could be compensated by
seigniorage prots.
The aim of this thesis is to study the impact of corruption and
seigniorage on scal and monetary instruments and on central bank con-
servativeness. Fiscal and monetary policies constitute the main concerns
in macroeconomic theory since they are the primary macroeconomic in-
struments on the control of the authorities. An understanding of these
issues is crucial for the design of more e¢ cient and e¤ective economic
policies.
A crucial assumption that I make in this thesis is a connection be-
tween the scal capacity of the governments and its quality. Specically,
weak institutions cause a leakage of the tax revenue and I focus on cor-
ruption as the main reason for tax leakage. I develop corruption as in
Huang and Wei (2006). Specically, the private sector pays taxes, but
only a proportion of this amount is used to nance public spending.
Thus, when there is complete corruption, tax revenues are "eaten up".
Moreover, I model seigniorage as in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998) and
Hefeker (2010), the revenue from ination that it is transferred from the
central bank to public spending of each government.
1.2 Literature Review
1.2.1 Corruption
Corruption is a debatable topic not only for the press but also for aca-
demic researchers. One of the di¢ culties of studying this topic lies in
dening corruption. Since it is not easy to agree with a precise deni-
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1. Introduction 3
tion, I follow Jain (2001) who refers corruption as acts in which the power
of public o¢ ce is used for personal gain.
To the best of my knowledge, causes and consequences of corrup-
tion have been discussed since the 1960s. In this thesis, I focus only
on consequences of corruption. Beginning with Le¤ (1964) and Hunt-
ington (1968), some authors have exposed that corruption may benet
economic growth. The main reasons are as follows: (i) corrupt practices
such as "speed money" may help in reducing bureaucratic delay, and (ii)
government employees who receive bribes may work harder. By contrast,
Shleifer and Vishny (1993) argue that corruption tends to lower economic
growth. In this line, Mauro (1995) nds a negative association between
corruption and investment and hence, corruption is detrimental to eco-
nomic growth. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Mauro (1997) indicate
that corruption causes misallocations of public expenditures.
In the last decade, some papers have explored the e¤ects of corruption
in frameworks where there are interactions between scal and monetary
policies (Huang and Wei, 2006; Hefeker, 2010; Faure, 2011; Dimakou,
2013; among others). In what follows, I summarise their main results.
The rst study in my overview is Huang and Wei (2006). These
authors examine the consequence of weak public governance (e.g., cor-
ruption) on the design of monetary policy with complete seigniorage
revenues. They nd that developing countries with lower institutional
quality should have less conservative central bankers.
Hefeker (2010) is interested in the connection between institutional
quality, the scal system and the choice of the exchange rate regime in
diverse frameworks: a monetary autonomy, a hard peg and a full mon-
etary union with two countries. In contrast to Huang and Wei (2006),
Hefeker (2010) allows for di¤erent degrees of seigniorage and the govern-
ment sets the institutional quality. He obtains that when a monetary
autonomy moves to a full monetary union, the level of corruption can
increase or decrease. This result depends mainly on the choice of part-
ner countries for the monetary union. Hefeker (2010) also shows that a
credibly xed exchange rate to a low ination country may reduce the
degree of corruption.
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1. Introduction 4
Faure (2011) investigates the consequences of institutional decien-
cies regarding public debt on welfare. He considers an extension of the
Huang and Weis (2006) framework since Faure (2011) assumes that the
government benets from complete seigniorage revenues, taxes and newly
issued debt. Besides, the government controls the tax and ination rates.
He nds that corruption can make a country better o¤ if the government
is more worried about output than ination stabilisation.
Dimakou (2013) explores the interactions among the decisions of dele-
gating monetary policy to more conservative central bank and combating
bureaucratic corruption. She nds that these decisions are strategic com-
plementarities and she identies a set of structural determinants that
a¤ect the decisions of the government to enhance economic institutions.
1.2.2 Seigniorage
Regarding the seigniorages literature, one of the rst studies on the
revenue from ination is Friedman (1971). He argues that a government
monopoly of at money issue can not produce at zero cost because there
are two di¤erent relevant prices to issue money: the goods and services
that are given up to get a dollar and the number of cents per dollar that
the money holder needs to keep his real balances constant (per year).
Seigniorage revenue has been a source of government nance for most
of the countries. In modern at money economies, the central banks
have the power to print money. The importance of seigniorage revenue
as another source of government revenue di¤ers across countries. Cukier-
man et al. (1992) show empirically that countries with a more unstable
and polarised political system have more ine¢ cient tax structures and,
hence, they rely more on seigniorage. Furthermore, they suggest that
high seigniorage, low independence of central bank and high regime in-
stability are likely to appear together. Gros (2004) states that poorer
member states in the European Union are beneted by the distribution
of seigniorage because its share in the monetary income of the European
Central Bank is calculated on population shares instead of the GDP per
capita. Leen (2011) studies if seigniorage can be a solution to the re-
form of the EU budget. He concludes that seigniorage is as a nancial
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transaction tax and an European Union VAT.
There are few studies that focus on the e¤ects of seigniorage on s-
cal and monetary instruments. Huang and Wei (2006) show that, under
commitment, a La¤er curve e¤ect on seigniorage revenue can lower the
ination rate and raise the tax rate. Hefeker (2010) nds that the tax
rate is falling in an increase in the degree of seigniorage. Thus, seignior-
age may have positive output e¤ects. Myles and Youse (2015) explore
if the correlation between the level of corruption and the rate of ination
can be a consequence of a government exploiting seigniorage as a com-
pensation for revenue lost because of corruption. They provide that a
rational policy response to the existence of corruption may be the cause
of excessive ination.
There is one paper, Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), which includes
seigniorage in a model of a monetary union. They analyse the social
welfare of a monetary union in two types of arrangements: making the
common central bank more conservative and imposing an ination tar-
get. They nd that an optimally designed conservative common cen-
tral bank is typically preferred to an optimal ination target. They
demonstrate that monetary unication reduces ination, taxes and pub-
lic spending with benevolent policymakers and scal leadership. Besides,
if the number of participants in the union increases, these disciplining
e¤ects become stronger and they are likely to raise social welfare. They
also conclude that scal coordination is prejudicial to social welfare if
money holdings are low and social benets from seigniorage are small.
1.3 Contribution to the Literature
The contribution of this thesis to the literature is explained specically
in the following paragraphs.
In the second chapter, I examine the e¤ects of corruption and seignior-
age on the output growth and ination rates assuming that there are a
government and a central bank. This chapter builds on the static Alesina
and Tabellini (1987) and Huang and Wei (2006) frameworks allowing for
di¤erent degrees of seigniorage. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) analyse the
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e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of independence of the central bank and if
the coordination between monetary and scal policies are welfare im-
proving. I depart from Alesina and Tabellini (1987) since in my study
tax revenues are a¤ected by institutional quality. Although Huang and
Wei (2006) focus on studying the implications of weak public institutions
for the design of monetary policymaking institutions, they also compare
how corruption a¤ects tax and ination rates between commitment and
discretion cases. I extend Huang and Weis framework allowing more di-
versity in the policymakerspreferences (i.e., the government and central
bank) and di¤erent degrees of seigniorage. Further, I do a review of the
literature about corruption, output growth and ination rates, I contrast
my results with the literature and I give intuitions about my ndings.
The third chapter contains joint work with Montserrat Ferré and Car-
olina Manzano. We bring together the literatures on central bank conser-
vativeness, seigniorage and corruption considering also one government
and one central bank. Therefore, we analyse how conservative should an
independent central bank be in an economy with corruption and seignior-
age. We introduce a new indicator of the conservativeness of the central
bank that will depend on the relative importance attributed to output
and public spending stabilisation with respect to ination, as well as on
the level of corruption and seigniorage. Our model departs from Huang
and Wei (2006) and Dimakou (2013) in four important ways. First, we
include shocks. Second, we allow the authorities to have di¤erent rela-
tive interest in output over spending stabilisation. Third, we allow for
di¤erent degrees of seigniorage. Fourth, we propose an indicator of the
degree of conservativeness.
In the fourth chapter, I study how corruption a¤ects monetary and
scal policy interactions in a monetary union with two countries. There
are some works that analyse the interaction of monetary and scal poli-
cies and my work is related to three of them. Hefeker (2010) models
corruption as an endogenous variable in a framework with a monetary
union. My chapter di¤ers from him in many respects, but most notably
in three: (i) I allow for more asymmetries between countries since in
my framework, all the authorities have di¤erent preferences on the au-
thoritiesobjectives, di¤erent output target levels between countries and
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there is only one country with a corrupt government, (ii) my purpose is
to analyse the e¤ects of corruption on both countries, and (iii) I assume
corruption as a share of tax revenue, as in Huang and Wei (2006).2 My
work is also related to Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and Beetsma and
Giuliodori (2010), who look at monetary unions with asymmetric coun-
tries since targets and preferences between countries may di¤er. Dixit
and Lambertini (2001) analyse the interaction of monetary and scal
policies in a monetary union and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) investi-
gate the macroeconomic costs and benets of monetary unication, e.g.,
how conicts between the scal authorities and the European Central
Bank about the macroeconomic objectives may produce a race among
policymakers. In their analysis, they do not consider corruption and the
scal authorities are only concerned about ination and output stabili-
sation. Hence, my chapter di¤ers from them in two aspects: (i) I include
corruption, and (ii) I assume that scal authorities are concerned about
public spending stabilisation. To sum up, according to di¤erent studies
in this literature, I propose to analyse the e¤ect of corruption in a new
setup.
1.4 Relationship between Chapters
There are two underlying themes which connect the frameworks of the
chapters of this thesis. The rst is corruption. In the following chapters,
it is assumed that the quality of institutions is poor, in the sense that
governments are ine¢ cient collecting taxes. Therefore, in all three chap-
ters there is corruption. However, it is important to point out that, in
the fourth chapter, only one country has an ine¢ cient tax system while
the other country does not.
The second theme is based on the monetary income, known as seignior-
age. In the second and third chapters, public expenditures can be -
nanced by tax and seigniorage revenues, while in the fourth chapter both
governments nance their spending only through taxes.
2Although Huang and Wei (2006) analyse the e¤ects of institutional quality, they
do not study these e¤ects in a monetary union.
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Moreover, positive and normative aspects of the theory are examined
in these chapters. Concretely, the economic outlook of the positive the-
ory of economics is examined in the second and fourth chapters since I
explore the economy of "what is". In the third and fourth chapters, I
concentrate on the normative facet of the discipline since I am interested
in "what ought to be" in economic matters. Therefore, both positive and
normative facets are examined in Chapter 4.
1.5 Results
Let me nish the introduction with the main results found in my thesis.
In the second chapter, I analyse four aspects. First, I examine the
e¤ects of corruption on output growth rate. Second, I study the rela-
tionship between corruption and the ination rate. I nd under which
conditions an increase in the degree of corruption has a positive (nega-
tive) impact on output and the ination rate. Specically, for poor levels
of institutional quality, an increase in the level of corruption increases
output growth rate and decreases the incentives to inate. However, for
high levels of institutional quality, these results are reversed. Third, I
study the e¤ect of seigniorage on output and I show that there is always
a positive relationship between them. Fourth, I analyse the connection
between seigniorage and the ination rate. I nd under which conditions
seigniorage has a positive (negative) e¤ect on the ination rate. Con-
cretely, for low (high) levels of seigniorage, the increase in the degree
of seigniorage increases (decreases) the incentives to inate. According
to the literature, Huang and Weis (2006) assumptions favour the posi-
tive (negative) relationship between corruption and the growth (ination)
rate with respect to my framework.
In the third chapter, we study the connection between seigniorage,
institutional quality of the government and the design of an independent
and conservative central bank. We nd that the relationship between
the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central bank and
the degree of corruption is a¤ected by the volatility of supply shocks.
Concretely, when these shocks are not important, the central bank should
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be less conservative if the degree of corruption increases. However, this
result may not hold when the shocks are relevant. Finally, if seigniorage
decreases, the central bank should be more conservative. According to
this literature, our results are in line with the results derived by Huang
and Wei (2006) and Dimakou (2013), when the shocks are not important,
and hence, we can conclude that their results are robust since they are
obtained in a more general framework. In contrast, when the shocks are
relevant, we may nd an opposite result that the literature has found. It
is worth mentioning that I have not found any study about the e¤ects of
seigniorage on central bank conservativeness.
In the fourth chapter, I extend the model from one country to two
countries and I examine how corruption in one country may a¤ect both
the corrupt and the e¢ cient country in a monetary union. I demonstrate
that this feature has important implications in a monetary union with
two asymmetric countries. Country 1 has a corrupt government while
country 2 does not. Within this framework, I determine under which
conditions an increase in the degree of corruption damages or benets
both countries. I nd that an increase in the level of corruption in country
1 may have a negative e¤ect on country 2. In particular, when the
government of country 1 is more concerned about public spending than
output, an increase in corruption damages both countries. Hence, the
main research question is to answer how country 1 could compensate
country 2 for the negative externality. These ndings may have some
implications for the Greek case, concretely in the austerity measures
that the European Central Bank, the European Commission and the
International Monetary Fund have been ordered.
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Chapter 2
The E¤ects of Corruption and
Seigniorage on Growth and
Ination
2.1 Introduction
Corruption is capturing a lot of attention around the world. It is one
particular feature that is prevalent in developing economies. However,
developed countries are not immune to this problem, even though it is
less common than in many developing countries. The therm corrup-
tion encompasses di¤erent meanings such as bribery, the sale of public
property by government o¢ cials, kickbacks in public procurement, and
misuse of government funds (Reinikka and Svensson, 2005). In our chap-
ter, we dene corruption as the abuse of public o¢ ce for private gain
(Jain, 2001).
Doubts have arisen as to whether corruption is detrimental or bene-
cial for the economy. Thus, a number of related questions on this topic
have evoked genuine interest among economists. How can corruption
impact on output growth rate? What are the e¤ects of corruption on
ination? If we consider the empirical studies that focus on the relation-
ship between corruption and growth, it is surprising to nd out that they
o¤er mixed results (see Le¤, 1964; Mauro, 1995; Aidt et al., 2008; among
others). On the other hand, it is found that the relationship between
14
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corruption and ination is positive in the literature (Al-Marhubi, 2000;
and Haider et al., 2011).
The following two graphs illustrate the relationship between the an-
nual percentage growth rate of GDP and the annual percentage of in-
ation (the consumer price index) with the corruption perception index
for a sample of 38 countries around the world.1 The corruption percep-
tion index shows how public sectors are perceived to be corrupt. Higher
values of the index correspond to less corruption. The corruption per-
ception index is on a scale whose maximum is 100. The data covers the
period between 2000 and 2014. We use the Database of Worldbank to
select GDP growth and the annual percentage of ination. Moreover,
we have used the Database of Transparency International to select the
corruption perception index. In Fig. 2.1, there does not seem to be a
clear relationship between growth and corruption. Notice, however, that
the tendency for ination presented in Fig. 2.2 seems to be positive.
Figure 2.1: Relationship between the annual percentage of GDP growth
(vertical axes) and the corruption perception index between 2000 and
2014 for a sample of 38 countries.
1Following Mauro (1995), we have chosen the following countries according to the
available data: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark,
Ecuador, Egypt, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia,
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, Nige-
ria, Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Spain, Sweden,
Thailand, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States.
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Figure 2.2: Relationship between the annual percentage of ination (ver-
tical axes) and the corruption perception index between 2000 and 2014
for a sample of 38 countries.
In this chapter we present a theoretical model that attempts to ex-
plain the impact of corruption and seigniorage on output growth and in-
ation rates. To this end, we extend the framework developed by Huang
and Wei (2006) in two ways: rst, we allow di¤erent degrees of seignior-
age, and second, we permit di¤erent preferences among the authorities.
Concretely, we assume di¤erent degrees of seigniorage given that we fo-
cus on countries with di¤erent levels of development. The concept of
seigniorage refers to the di¤erence between the face value of a note or
coin and its costs of production and mintage (Buiter, 2007). Allowing
di¤erent preferences among the authorities in the model indicates two
facts: the governing body of the central bank is not the outcome of elec-
tions and the central bank tends to assign a greater weight to ination
relative to output and public expenditures than the government.
The model developed in this chapter captures the public nancing of
developed and developing countries through seigniorage and/or tax rev-
enues. Developed countries have governments which are able to nance
their expenditures mainly through taxes. However, developing countries
tend to have ine¢ cient institutions and hence, they get more nance
through seigniorage and less through taxes than developed countries.
In this area, corruption can play an important role as it lowers tax rev-
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enues (Ghura, 1998; Mokhtari and Grafova, 2007; Ajaz and Ahmad, 2010;
among others). The reliance of many developing countries on seigniorage
is a reality, often due to an ine¢ cient tax system. Although seigniorage
is more relevant in developing economies, Vergote et al. (2010) expose
that seigniorage income is a reliable income source in the long run for the
European Central Bank. The distribution of seigniorage income to all the
Member States of the Eurozone depends on their relative weight on the
GDP in the Euro Area. However, the Governing Council of the European
Central Bank can retain all the European Central Banks seigniorage to,
for example, cover expenses (Krsnakova and Oberleithner, 2012).
In this chapter, we will show that the impact of corruption on growth
is ambiguous since it depends on the level of institutional quality. Con-
cretely, for poor levels of institutional quality, an increase in the degree
of corruption favours the growth rate, whereas the reversal result may
hold for high levels of institutional quality. Thus, our results could pro-
vide a rationale for the mixed empirical ndings. Moreover, we nd that
the e¤ects of corruption and seigniorage on ination rate are also am-
biguous. Specically, the impact of corruption on the ination rate also
depends on the level of institutional quality. In addition, we obtain that
an increase in the level of seigniorage always enhances output growth
rate.
The remainder of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2.2 sur-
veys the related literature on the linkage between corruption, seignior-
age, output growth rate and the ination rate. Section 2.3 describes
our model. Section 2.4 discusses the e¤ects of corruption and seignior-
age. Section 2.5 presents some numerical cases. Section 2.6 concludes.
Finally, the proofs of the main results are included in the Appendix.
2.2 Literature Review
This section surveys the empirical and theoretical literature on the ef-
fects of corruption and seigniorage on some economic variables such as
economic growth and ination.
In the empirical literature on corruption, the most frequently used
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON CORRUPTION, SEIGNIORAGE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. 
Judit Garcia Fortuny 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1678-2015
2. The E¤ects of Corruption and Seigniorage on Growth and
Ination 18
measures of institutional quality are those of Business International,
International Country Risk Guide, Transparency International and the
World Bank.2
First of all, we discuss the relationship between corruption and eco-
nomic growth given that this has been a major concern for academics.
The empirical literature indicates that this relationship is ambiguous.
Economistsreections have been divided between those who nd that
corruption produces prejudicial e¤ects on economic performance and
those who see that corruption could accelerate economic growth.
The negative relationship between corruption and economic growth
has been identied in numerous empirical studies (for instance, Mauro,
1995; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001; Aidt et al., 2008; Adewale, 2011;
among others).3 These investigations have indicated various ways in
which corruption damages economic growth, such as lowering investment
(Mauro, 1995; Del Monte and Papagni, 2001), inciting the people who
live in countries with high quality institutions to search employment in
the informal sector (Aidt et al., 2008), and causing capital ight in illegal
deposits abroad (Adewale, 2011).
By contrast, other researchers have found that corruption may be ben-
ecial around the world, e.g., Rock and Bonnett (2004) in the large East
Asian newly industrialised countries, Méon and Weill (2010) in countries
where institutions are extremely ine¤ective and Dreher and Gassebner
(2013) in highly regulated economies.4 One of the most popular justi-
cations of this relationship relies on the fact that corruption could be
benecial in a second best world because of the distortions caused by
bad functioning institutions (Le¤, 1964; Huntington, 1968). It is argued
that if the governmental procedures or regulations that hinder economic
activity for private agents are allowed, corruption may act to "grease"
the economy.
In the last fteen years, empirical studies have also analysed the
2Jain (2001), Johnston (2001) and Salinas and Salinas (2007) give a summary of
the di¤erent institutional quality measures used in the empirical literature.
3Mo (2001) and Ibraheem et al. (2013) also report this result.
4Other authors point out this result such as Vial and Hanoteau (2010) and Dzhu-
mashev (2014), among others.
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impact of corruption on ination, nding a positive relationship (Al-
Marhubi, 2000; Abed and Davoodi, 2000; Haider et al., 2011).5 In this
sense, Al-Marhubi (2000) is the rst who analyses the relationship be-
tween corruption and ination around the world. He nds that higher
corruption is associated with higher ination. Abed and Davoodi (2000)
nd a positive impact of corruption on ination in some transition coun-
tries. By contrast, they nd that corruption is not signicant when a
structural reform index is included. The paper of Haider et al. (2011)
shows that lower corruption is associated with lower ination in demo-
cratic regimes since weak governments with high corruption rely more on
seigniorage to nance their public expenditures, which a¤ects ination.
There seems to be little empirical research on seigniorage. Bose et al.
(2007) nd that the growth e¤ect is large and signicantly negative in
developing countries. An increase in the seigniorage revenue alters the
relative rate of return between a nonproductive liquid asset and a pro-
ductive illiquid asset since nancial intermediaries shift their portfolios
in favour of the liquid asset and thus, it causes a detrimental e¤ect on
the economic growth. In contrast, Adam and Bevan (2005) show that
seigniorage-nancing appears to be signicantly growth-enhancing below
the threshold of 1.25% of GDP when it is used to nance productive ex-
penditure (expenditure on health, education, infrastructure, public order
and safety and public administration). From our knowledge, the e¤ects
of seigniorage on ination have not yet been empirically developed.
Once the empirical literature has been analysed, it is also important
to review the theoretical literature. Huang and Wei (2006), Faure (2011)
and Dimakou (2013) assume complete seigniorage in order to analyse the
e¤ect of corruption on their main variables. Huang and Wei (2006) con-
sider that weak institutions (e.g., corruption) cause a leakage of tax rev-
enue and examine the e¤ects of institutional quality on ination targeting
and exchange rate xing. They further study the implications for the de-
sign of several other monetary frameworks, including a currency board,
dollarisation and a Rogo¤-type conservative central banker. The main
result derived in Huang and Wei (2006) is that more corruption leads the
5These ndings are consistent with Rahmani and Youse (2009).
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central bank to be less conservative. Faure (2011) provides a new insight
into the lack of incentive from authorities to curtail corruption. He as-
sumes corruption as in Huang and Wei (2006). The main nding is that
corruption can make a country better o¤ if its government is unable to
make binding commitments and assigns a larger weight to output than to
ination stabilisation. Dimakou (2013) analyses the interactions among
the decisions of delegating monetary policy to more conservative central
bank and combating bureaucratic corruption. Her study also builds on
Huang and Weis framework (2006) allowing for borrowing and system-
atically assessing the incentives to improve economic institutions. She
identies a set of structural determinants that a¤ect the decisions of the
government to enhance economic institutions. Finally, Hefeker (2010) is
interested in the connection between corruption, the scal system and
the choice of the exchange rate regime in diverse frameworks: a mone-
tary autonomy, a hard peg and a monetary union. Unlike Huang and
Wei (2006), he allows for di¤erent degrees of seigniorage and he supposes
corruption as an absolute sum that can even be larger than tax revenue.
He nds that in a country with low ination, a credibly xed exchange
rate can reduce corruption and improve the scal system. He also ob-
tains that a high tax revenue leads government to allow more corruption
and vice-versa, and lower seigniorage implies higher taxes and may have
negative output e¤ects.6
2.3 The Model
The model we use expands the model of Huang and Wei (2006) to al-
low for di¤erent degrees of seigniorage and di¤erent preferences on the
authoritiesobjectives. We assume a modied Lucas supply function in
which the level of output, x; depends positively on unexpected ination,
   e. Besides, output depends negatively on the tax rate,  .7 To be
more precise, output is given by
6Basu (2001) nds that, for low levels of bank reserves, seigniorage has a growth-
enhancing e¤ect. For him, imposing a reserve requirement on the banking sector
generates seigniorage.
7All variables are expressed in logarithms.
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x =    e    : (2.1)
The model includes two policies, scal and monetary policy. Fiscal policy
is controlled by the government and monetary policy is controlled by the
central bank. We also assume that there could be corruption in the
government, as in Huang and Wei (2006). Following these authors, the
private sector pays a tax rate in the amount of  , but only a portion of
it, , will be used for public spending. Hence, the governments public
spending function is described by
g =  + k; (2.2)
where g denotes the ratio of public expenditures over output, 0 6  6 1
and 0 6 k 6 1. Hence, there are two sources of nance: tax and seignior-
age revenue. On the one hand,  represents the tax revenue, where 
indicates the degree of institutional quality. Specically, when  = 1
there is no corruption, whereas  = 0 means that the collection system
collapses as there is full corruption. On the other hand, k measures the
seigniorage revenue where k represents the degree of seigniorage. Thus,
when k = 1 there is complete seigniorage, whereas k = 0 is the case
where there are no benets through seigniorage revenue.
The sequence of events is such that expectations are set and after-
wards the government and central bank, simultaneously, choose the tax
and ination rates, respectively.
The government and central bank optimise, respectively, the following
loss functions:
LG =
1
2
 
2 + Gx
2 + G (g   g)2

; (2.3)
where G; G > 0, g  0 and the subscript G represents the government,
and
LCB =
1
2
 
2 + CBx
2 + CB (g   g)2

; (2.4)
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where CB > 0, CB  0 and the subscript CB represents the central
bank.
Note that the government and central bank aim at stabilising ina-
tion, output and public spending. The parameters i and i (i = G;CB)
represent the relative weights on output and public spending stabilisa-
tion with respect to ination for each authority. In the literature, there
does not seem to be an agreement about the particular values of the
weights in the loss functions. Alesina and Tabellini (1987) argue that
the two policymakers can di¤er in the weights attributed to output and
public spending relative to ination. As these authors point out, an in-
dependent central bank is not subject to elections and, in most industrial
countries, it enjoys various degrees of independence from the scal au-
thority. Hence, we assume that the relative weights of both authorities
are di¤erent (G 6= CB and G 6= CB). In addition, the target levels for
ination and output are normalised to zero and the target level for pub-
lic spending is denoted by g. Following Dixit and Lambertini (2003), we
assume that scal and monetary authorities have identical targets.
Substituting the Expressions (2.1) and (2.2) into (2.3) and (2.4), the
loss functions of both authorities can be rewritten as follows
LG =
1
2
 
2 + G (   e   )2 + G ( + k   g)2

and (2.5)
LCB =
1
2
 
2 + CB (   e   )2 + CB ( + k   g)2

: (2.6)
The Nash equilibrium is obtained by minimising the governments and
central banks loss functions, the Expressions (2.5) and (2.6), with re-
spect to tax and ination rates, respectively. Hence, the corresponding
optimisation problems are
min

LG and
min

LCB:
The following proposition provides the optimal tax and ination rates:
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Proposition 1. The tax and ination rates in equilibrium are given by
  =

2 + G + k
g and (2.7)
 =

2 + G + k
g; (2.8)
where  = CB + kGCB and G =
G
G
:
This proposition shows that the higher is the public spending target,
the higher tax and ination rates are set. An increase in the public
spending target requires more tax nancing. Moreover, an increase in
the spending target requires more seigniorage nancing and hence, the
ination rate depends positively on the public spending target.
Moreover,8 it follows that public spending and output deviations are
g   g = G

 and (2.9)
0  x = 

: (2.10)
Note that these deviations are increasing in the ination rate, meaning
that a higher ination rate induces more public spending and output de-
viations. In particular, the higher the need to nance the public spending
(i.e., an increase in g), the higher ination, output and public spending
deviations. In addition, from the Expressions (2.9) and (2.10), it follows
that the average levels of public spending and output fall short of their
targets, showing the trade-o¤ the scal authority faces between spending
and output.
2.4 Comparative Statics
In the next two subsections we will present some comparative static re-
sults. In particular, we analyse the e¤ects of corruption and seigniorage
on the levels of growth and ination rates.
8Notice that the Expressions (2.9) and (2.10) make sense when  6= 0:
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2.4.1 Institutional Quality
In this part, we analyse how corruption a¤ects the growth and ination
rates.
Corollary 2. In equilibrium:
a) the growth rate increases with corruption if and only if  < x; and
b) the ination rate decreases with corruption if and only if  < ;
where
x =
p
G(k2CB + 1) and  = G
 s
k22CB
2CB
+
1
G
  kCB
CB
!
;
with x > .
Corollary 2a shows that, in general, the e¤ect of corruption on the
growth rate depends on the level of institutional quality. For poor levels
of institutional quality
 
 < x

, corruption favours growth, whereas the
opposite result may hold if  > x. It is worth mentioning that if the
scal authority is more concerned about the output objective than the
public spending objective (G > 1), then x > 1. Consequently, we can
conclude that in this case a positive relationship between corruption and
growth always arises. However, when G is low enough, corruption has
a negative e¤ect on growth at moderate levels of institutional quality 
 > x

:
To intuitively understand the impact of corruption on the growth rate,
notice rst that an increase in corruption lowers tax revenues

@
@
 > 0

.
As the institutional quality worsens, ceteris paribus, the scal authority
has incentives to increase the tax rate in order to compensate the reduc-
tion in public spending nancing. However, the increase in the tax rate
negatively a¤ects the output rate. When  < x
 
 > x

the cost of
increasing the tax rate overcomes (does not overcome) the corresponding
benet and, consequently, the government prefers to reduce (rise) its tax
rate resulting in an increase (decrease) in output.
Corollary 2b indicates that, in general, the impact of corruption on
ination depends on the level of institutional quality.9 Bear in mind that
9In another framework, neither do Myles and Youse (2015) nd a direct relation-
ship between corruption and the ination rate.
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the central bank will set ination of corruption taking into account two
e¤ects: the impact of lower institutional quality on tax revenues (spend-
ing e¤ect) and the impact of a higher or lower tax rate on output (output
e¤ect). Whenever  > x; an increase in the degree of corruption leads
to lower tax collection and higher tax rates, so the central bank will have
more incentives to inate. When  < x; the spending e¤ect and the
output e¤ect will work in opposite directions: as the degree of corrup-
tion increases, there will be lower tax collection and the government will
set lower taxes. According to the rst e¤ect, the central bank will have
more incentives to inate, but the second e¤ect will lead the central bank
to set a lower ination. Whenever  <  < x; the spending e¤ect dom-
inates and the ination rate will be higher. For high levels of corruption 
 < 

; the output e¤ect dominates and the central bank will set a
lower ination rate. Further, it can be seen that when the government is
relatively very interested in stabilising output over spending (i.e., G is
high enough) and the central bank places a high relative weight on the
output objective (i.e., kCB
CB
is low enough),  > 1: in this case, a reduc-
tion in the degree of institutional quality will always reduce the ination
rate.
To sum up, Figure 2.3 illustrates the e¤ect of corruption on the av-
erage levels of growth and ination.
Figure 2.3: Relationship between output, the ination rate and corrup-
tion.
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The existing empirical literature points out that corruption leads to
higher ination. Looking at Fig. 2.3, this would indicate that  > 
and this could suggest that, in fact,  is probably the minimum level of
corruption that we would nd. Notice that in this area, corruption can
enhance or damage the growth rate. This is in line with the mixed results
found related to the e¤ect of corruption on the growth rate as discussed
in Section 2.2. From this analysis we can conclude that the assumptions
made in Huang andWei (2006) favour the positive (negative) relationship
between corruption and the growth (ination) rate with respect to our
framework.
2.4.2 Seigniorage
We now derive some comparative static results for the case of seigniorage.
Given that seigniorage, as a source of revenue, tends to be smaller as the
monetary and scal institutions of a country become more sophisticated,
we will study the e¤ects of a reduction in seigniorage. Thus, the following
corollary provides the e¤ects of seigniorage on the equilibrium values of
growth and ination rates:
Corollary 3. In equilibrium:
a) the growth rate always increases with the degree of seigniorage, and
b) the ination rate increases with the degree of seigniorage if and only
if k < k;
where k =
q
(2+G)GCB CB
GCB
:10
The rationale intuition behind Corollary 3a is as follows. When the
degree of seigniorage decreases, the total revenue through ination de-
creases ( @
@k
k > 0). This implies that the scal authority has more
incentive to increase its tax rate to get more tax nancing.11 Hence, a
lower degree of seigniorage damages output growth rate.
10Notice that k decreases if the central bank attaches more relative weight to output
and so, there are more cases in which an increase in seigniorage leads central bank to
have less incentive to inate.
11Hefeker (2010) and Caballé and Hromcová (2011) also obtain a negative relation-
ship between seigniorage and the tax rate (in expected terms).
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In addition, Corollary 3b indicates that Corollary 3a has two e¤ects
on the behaviour of the central bank: on the one hand, taking into
account the objective of output, the increase in the tax rate increases
the incentives to inate; on the other hand, given the objective of public
spending, the increase in tax rate decreases the incentives to inate.
Notice that the reduction in seigniorage revenue leads to an increase in
the ination rate whenever the central bank prioritises considerably more
the stabilisation of output over public spending, so CB
CB
is high enough.
In this case, k < 0 and therefore, k > k. However, when CB
CB
is low
enough, the opposite could be true.
2.5 Numerical Cases
In this section, we visualise the theoretical results stated in Subsections
2.4.1 and 2.4.2. To this end, we replicate the relationship identied in the
theoretical model between corruption, seigniorage, growth and ination
rates.
The parameters of the model are depicted in Table 2.1. The relative
weight on the output gap deviation for the government has been observed
in several studies. Jensen (2002) and Tillmann (2008) set G = 0:25.
Walsh (2003) varies G until 1 and Dimakou (2013) until 1:2. Following
Dimakou (2013), we set G = 0:75 and G = 1:2 as the mean values
of Dimakous (2013) ranges. Moreover, following Alesina and Tabellini
(1987), we assume that G > CB and G > CB since the government
does not assign a greater weight to ination relative to output and public
spending than the central bank. Further, we assume that CB > CB
since some authors point out that the central bank is not worried about
stabilising the public spending (Debelle and Fischer, 1964; Beetsma and
Bovenberg, 2001; Hefeker, 2010). Hence, we assume that CB = 0:65
and CB = 0:15. Moreover, the degrees of institutional quality and of
seigniorage are set to vary within its full range, 0    1 and 0  k  1,
respectively. Finally, we set the value of the government spending target,
g = 0:28; extracted also from the mean range of Dimakou (2013).
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Parameter Value
G
Governments weight on output gap
relative to ination
0.75
G
Governments weight on public spending gap
relative to ination
1.2
CB
Central banks weight on output gap
relative to ination
0.65
CB
Central banks weight on public spending gap
relative to ination
0.15
 Degree of institutional quality 0.1-0.9
k Degree of seigniorage 0.002-0.8
g Public spending target 0.28
Table 2.1: Parameter values
Our analysis includes four sets of comparative static exercises divided
into two subsections, corruption and seigniorage. Concretely, in each
subsection, we simulate for output growth and ination rates. Thus, in
the rst subsection, we compare the optimal output growth and ination
rates for di¤erent levels of corruption and, in the second subsection, we
analyse the optimal output growth and ination rates under di¤erent
degrees of seigniorage.
2.5.1 Corruption
We start o¤ presenting our two rst specications where we compare two
cases in which the only di¤erence lies on the degree of seigniorage. In
one case (red line), we assume that k = 0:8 and in the other case (blue
line) k = 0:002,12 while growth or ination vary for di¤erent institu-
tional quality parameters. The high seigniorage simulation case would
attempt to represent developing countries (red line). By contrast, the
low seigniorage simulation case would depict developed economies (blue
line). Remember that institutional quality is inversely related to the level
of corruption.
12Following Gros (2004), we will represent seigniorage for developed countries less
than one quarter of 1 per cent.
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2.5.1.1 Growth and Institutional Quality
Fig. 2.4 depicts the optimal growth rate for two di¤erent seigniorage
degrees at di¤erent levels of corruption. We can see that higher levels of
corruption ( < 0:83 for developing countries and  < 0:79 for developed
countries) have a positive e¤ect on the growth rate. Hence, in this case,
our results are in line with the point of view that an increase in the
degree of corruption may be benecial for growth as Le¤ (1964), Rock
and Bonnett (2004) and Méon and Weill (2010), among others. However,
at the point where  > 0:83 for developing countries (red line) and  >
0:79 for developed countries (blue line), an increase in the degree of
corruption lowers growth, similarly to the empirical evidence found by
Mauro (1995) and Aidt et al. (2008). Note that more cases may be
found where an increase in the degree of corruption promotes the growth
rate in developing countries since their threshold (0:83) is higher than in
developed countries (0:79).
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
-0.15
-0.10
-0.05
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Low seigniorage
High seigniorage
Institutional quality
Growth rate
Figure 2.4: Relationship between institutional quality and the growth
rate when G=0.75, G=1.2, CB=0.65, CB=0.15 and g=0.28.
2.5.1.2 Ination and Institutional Quality
Fig. 2.5 indicates that higher levels of corruption ( < 0:68 for developing
countries and  < 0:79 for developed economies) lower the ination rate,
and thus, @
@
 > 0. Above these thresholds (i.e.,  > 0:68 for developing
countries and  > 0:79 for developed countries), an increase in the degree
of corruption leads to an increase in the ination rate, @
@
 < 0, as
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found by Al-Marhubi (2000), Abed and Davoodi (2000) and Haider et
al. (2011). Notice that the countries identied by the blue line appear
to be more sensitive to changes in corruption. Further, the threshold
for developed countries (0:79) is higher than for developing countries
(0:68). Hence, there are more cases where an increase in the degree
of corruption reduces the ination rate in developed countries than in
developing countries.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
Low seigniorage
High seigniorage
Institutional quality
Inflation rate
Figure 2.5: Relationship between institutional quality and the ination
rate when G=0.75, G=1.2, CB=0.65, CB=0.15 and g=0.28.
2.5.2 Seigniorage
In the two following specications, we focus on the impact of seigniorage
changes on the growth and ination rates in which the only di¤erence
lies on the levels of corruption. In the red line, the economy su¤ers from
a very high level of bureaucratic corruption,  = 0:1. In contrast, the
blue line represents an economy with high institutional quality,  = 0:9.
2.5.2.1 Growth and Seigniorage
Fig. 2.6 illustrates the previous theoretical result between seigniorage
and the growth rate, @
@k
x > 0. Hence, seigniorage has a positive e¤ect
on the growth rate for both levels of corruption.
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Figure 2.6: Relationship between seigniorage and the growth rate when
G=0.75, G=1.2, CB=0.65, CB=0.15 and g=0.28.
2.5.2.2 Ination and Seigniorage
Finally, we analyse the e¤ects of di¤erent degrees of seigniorage on the
ination rate. Fig. 2.7 reveals that for countries with low institutional
quality (red line), an increase in the degree of seigniorage increases the
ination rate. In that case, k = 1:91 and hence, @
@k
 > 0.13 However,
for countries with high institutional quality, the blue line shows that
an increase in the degree of seigniorage reduces the ination rate since,
in that case, k =  2:33 and thus, @
@k
 < 0. Therefore, according to
our particular values, we do not nd that 0  k  1. However, if
0:25    0:42; we will obtain 0  k  1.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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Figure 2.7: Relationship between seigniorage and the ination rate when
G=0.75, G=1.2, CB=0.65, CB=0.15 and g=0.28.
13See Subsection 2.4.2.
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2.6 Conclusions
The literature about corruption has given the impression that the world
is divided in two types of people: the sandersand the greasers. The
sandersconsider that corruption is detrimental to development, while
the greasersthink that corruption may enhance development. The pur-
pose of this chapter is to study the relationship between corruption,
seigniorage, output growth and ination rates.
We extend the model of Huang and Wei (2006) allowing di¤erent
preferences among the authorities and permitting di¤erent degrees of
seigniorage. This chapter provides three contributions to the literature.
The rst one is to provide a theoretical underpinning for the mixed em-
pirical results found in the literature on the relationship between output
growth and corruption. The second one is to give a theoretical foundation
on the positive e¤ect of corruption on the ination rate. The third one
is to provide a rationale for the impact of seigniorage on output growth
and ination rates.
This chapter concludes that the e¤ects of corruption on output growth
and ination rates are not straightforward. Thus, our results are in line
with Mauro (1995), Del Monte and Papagni (2001) and Adewale (2011)
who consider that corruption lowers growth and with Le¤ (1964), Méon
and Weill (2010) and Dreher and Gassebner (2013) who support the
greasinge¤ect of corruption. Moreover, we show that in some cases,
the degree of seigniorage increases the ination rate and in other cir-
cumstances, seigniorage decreases the ination rate. Besides, we nd
that seigniorage always has a positive e¤ect on output growth rate. Fi-
nally, we have performed a set of comparative static exercises employing
numerical simulations.
Several extensions are left for future research. A rst one is to develop
the model in a Stackelberg game with, for example, the government as
the leader. It may be more realistic since monetary policy can be ad-
justed more quickly than scal policy. A second one is to consider that
the government can get nance through public debt with a two period
dynamic environment. A third one is to examine the di¤erence between
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developed and developing countries on the issue of central banks indepen-
dence with corrupt governments. Finally, a fourth one is to introduce the
cost in ghting corruption and to study the optimal level of corruption.
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Appendix
Derivation of Expression (2.1). Following Alesina and Tabellini
(1987), the Expression (2.1) is derived from the following optimisation
problem of a competitive rm in period t:
maxLt (1   t)PtXt  WtLt
s:t: Xt = L

t ; 0 <  < 1;
where Lt is the labour,  t represents the tax rate on the total revenue
of rms, Pt is the price level, Xt denotes the real output and Wt is
the nominal wage (upper case letters denote antilogs). Thus, output is
produced by labour, where  indicates the output elasticity.
Solving for the rms optimisation problem, the rst-order condition is
given by
(1   t)PtL 1t = Wt:
Using the production function and taking logs (lower case letters denote
logs), we get
xt =

  1 (wt   ln  pt   ln (1   t)) :
Workers set wage (wt) to achieve a target real wage w: wt = w + pe;
where the e superscript denotes expected values. We will assume w = 0
since it is assumed that monetary policy inconsistency arises solely from
distortionary taxation. Finally, approximating ln (1   t) by   t yields
xt = a (t   e    t) + b;
where a = 
1  ; t and 
e are the actual and expected ination rates
respectively, with t  pt   pt 1; and b = 1  ln: For simplicity and
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following Debelle and Fischer (1964), we set  = 0:5, so that a = 1.
Moreover, we set b = 0 as in Alesina and Tabellini (1987), so the expres-
sion for output becomes (2.1).
Derivation of Expression (2.2). The Expression (2.2) has been
obtained as follows. The government budget constraint in nominal terms
is given by
PtGt =  tPtXt +Mt  Mt 1;
where Gt denotes the public spending,  is the degree of corruption and
Mt the nominal money supply. We will assume that MtPt = k
X as in
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), where k is the degree of seigniorage and
X denotes an output level.
Dividing the government budget constraint by nominal income, PtXt;
yields
Gt
Xt
=  t +
Mt  Mt 1
PtXt
:
Taking into account the money demand function and approximating Xt
to X as in Dimakou (2013), we get
Gt
Xt
=  t + k
Pt   Pt 1
Pt
: (2.11)
Finally, approximating t to
Pt Pt 1
Pt
in the Expression (2.11), the govern-
ment budget constraint can be rewritten in real terms as the Expression
(2.2).
Proof of Expressions (2.7) and (2.8). Remember that the gov-
ernment and central bank solve the following problems:
min

LG and
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min

LCB:
Using the Expressions (2.5) and (2.6), and considering e constant in the
problems, the rst-order conditions are given by
@LG
@
=  G (   e   ) + G ( + k   g) = 0 and
@LCB
@
=  + CB (   e   ) + kCB ( + k   g) = 0:
Hence, it follows that
 =
(G   kG)   G (e) + Gg
G + 
2G
and (2.12)
 =
CB (
e + )  kCB (   g)
1 + CB + k2CB
: (2.13)
Plugging the Expression (2.12) into (2.13) yields
 =
(g + e) 
2 + G + (+ k) 
; (2.14)
where  = CB + kGCB and G =
G
G
: Solving the Expression (2.14)
for e, we get
e =

2 + G + k
g: (2.15)
Using the Expression (2.15) in (2.12) and (2.13), and after some algebra,
we obtain the Expressions (2.7) and (2.8).
Proof of Corollary 2. Imposing rational expectations and using
the Expressions (2.1), (2.7) and (2.8) it follows that
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x =   
2 + G + k
g and (2.16)
Di¤erentiating the Expressions (2.16) and (2.8) with respect to the degree
of institutional quality (), we get
@
@
x =
2   G   k2GCB 
2 + G + k
2 g and
@
@
 =  
 
2   G

CB + 2kGCB 
2 + G + k
2 g:
Therefore, @
@
x < 0 if and only if  < x and
@
@
 > 0 if and only if
 < , where the expressions of x and  are given in the statement
of this corollary.
Proof of Corollary 3. Di¤erentiating the Expressions (2.16) and
(2.8) with respect to the degree of seigniorage (k), we obtain
@
@k
x = 
CB + 2kGCB 
2 + G + k
2 g and
@
@k
 =
 
2 + G

GCB   2 
2 + G + k
2 g:
Hence, @
@k
x > 0 and @
@k
 < 0 if and only if k > k, where the expression
of k is provided in this corollary.
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Chapter 3
Corruption, Seigniorage and
Central Bank
Conservativeness
3.1 Introduction
In the last two decades, cases of corruption have been unveiled in di¤er-
ent countries, raising public awareness and reinforcing a trend in which
society expects more from their leaders. In general, corruption involves
inappropriate use of political power and reects a failure of the political
institutions within a society (Jain, 2001).
Another trend that characterises the last two decades in all coun-
tries is the greater independence granted to central banks, which has
been particularly marked for developing and emerging market economies
(Crowe and Meade, 2008). In fact, after a series of inuential articles by,
among others, Rogo¤ (1985), Alesina and Tabellini (1987) and Debelle
and Fischer (1994), a majority of countries have adopted independent
and conservative central banks in order to lower ination. Acemoglu et
al. (2008), study whether such central bank independence is associated
with signicant declines in ination. According to the authors, the right
functioning of an independent and conservative central bank is a¤ected
by the quality of political institutions and the presence of political con-
straints, like corruption.
44
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In this chapter, we aim to study the connection between seigniorage,
institutional quality of the government and the design of an independent
and conservative central bank. To this end, we will extend the framework
developed by Alesina and Tabellini (1987) to allow di¤erent degrees of
seigniorage and to include corruption, in a similar way to Huang and Wei
(2006) and Dimakou (2013), who develop a framework to study the design
of monetary policy in developing economies. Our framework extends the
model of Huang and Wei (2006) and Dimakou (2013) in three important
ways: (i) we include shocks, (ii) we allow the authorities to have di¤erent
relative interest in output over spending stabilisation and, (iii) we allow
for di¤erent degrees of seigniorage. With the introduction of shocks,
we can ascertain the e¤ects of external perturbations in the model that
might a¤ect the behaviour of the central bank. By allowing the monetary
and scal authorities to have di¤erent preferences on their objectives, our
model allows for a more general specication of their preferences, encom-
passing but also extending previous models in the literature. Finally, we
include seigniorage in the form of ination nancing. In the developing
country literature, less e¢ cient tax collection, among other factors, tends
to increase dependence on the ination tax (Catao and Terrones, 2005).
It is worth mentioning that corruption is not only present in develop-
ing and transition economies, it also a¤ects developed economies. The
2013 corruption perception index of Transparency International, which
measures the perceived levels of public sector corruption for 177 coun-
tries, ranks OECD countries like Mexico, Greece, Italy and the Slovak
Republic in the middle third of the sample. Such countries, however,
generally enjoy an environment of price stability and seigniorage repre-
sents a small percentage of government revenues. For the Eurosystem,
seigniorage income is referred to as monetary income and it is accruing to
the individual national central banks (Handig and Holzfeind, 2007). In
order to develop a model that is also applicable to developed economies,
we will allow for seigniorage revenue to take di¤erent proportions.
We will introduce an indicator of the conservativeness of the central
bank that will depend on the relative importance attributed to output
and public spending stabilisation with respect to ination, as well as on
the levels of corruption and seigniorage. We will show that the optimal
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degree of conservativeness of the central bank should increase with in-
stitutional quality when shocks are not signicant. If the institutional
quality is poorer, the government has less resources through taxes and
thus, it is necessary to collect resources through seigniorage. Therefore,
the central bank should be less conservative. This result is in line with
the result derived by Huang and Wei (2006) and we can conclude that
their results are robust since it is obtained in a more general framework.
However, when the variability of shocks a¤ecting the economy is impor-
tant (such as in a major nancial crisis), this result may not hold. The
reason is that deviations of output and public spending and the variance
of ination are higher and, this, in some instances, leads the central bank
to be more conservative. We will also prove that the optimal degree of
conservativeness is negatively related to seigniorage. Therefore, if the
variability of shocks is not important, then economies with higher levels
of corruption and seigniorage should not design central banks that are
too conservative.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the model.
Section 3.3 studies how conservative the central bank should be when
there is some degree of corruption. The conclusions are presented in the
last section and proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
3.2 The Model
In this section, we will extend Alesina and Tabellinis model (1987) to
allow for di¤erent levels of seigniorage and for corruption, in a similar
way to Huang and Wei (2006). Following Alesina and Tabellini (1987),
Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Beetsma and Bovenberg (2001), among
others, we assume that workers are represented by trade unions whose
objective is to achieve a target real wage, the logarithm of which is nor-
malised to 0. Hence, the (log of the) nominal wage (w) is equal to the
expected (log of the) price level, pe.
Output of a representative rm is given by X = Le"=2; where X
denotes the real output, L represents labour,  indicates the output elas-
ticity and " represents a supply shock. We assume that " is independently
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and identically distributed with mean zero and variance 2". Distortionary
taxes are levied on production. The rm maximises prot, given by:
(1   )PLe"=2   WL, where  denotes the tax rate on total revenue
of rms. Solving for the rms labour demand, assuming it can hire the
labour it demands at the given nominal wage, taking logs, and after some
algebra, it follows that output supply is x = a (   e   ) + b + "
2(1 ) ;
where x denotes the (log of) real output, a = 
1  ;  is the ination
rate, e is the expected ination rate and b = 
1  ln: Following Debelle
and Fischer (1964), for simplicity, we set  = 0:5, so that a = 1 and we
approximate ln to 0. Thus, output is given by
x =    e    + ": (3.1)
We will introduce corruption in the model by assuming that there is a
connection between the governments scal capacity and the quality of
institutions. In this way, we will follow Huang and Wei (2006), where
the private sector pays a tax to the government, but only a proportion
of this amount, , is accrued. Thus, the government budget constraint is
g =  + k; (3.2)
where g represents public spending (as a share of non-distortionary out-
put),  is the degree of institutional quality (0    1) and k denotes
the degree of seigniorage (0  k  1).1 The right-hand side of the Ex-
pression (3.2) represents the two sources to nance public spending: tax
revenues () and seigniorage revenues (k). A low value of  indicates
that the resources obtained through taxes are small. Thus, institutional
quality will be inversely related to corruption:  = 1 will indicate ab-
sence of corruption, whereas complete corruption will occur when  = 0.
Therefore, the lower  is, the greater will be the leakage of tax revenues,
indicating a less e¤ective tax system. Thus, a low value of k implies that
public spending is mainly nanced through tax revenues, as in developed
1Gros (2004) shows that for the Euro area as a whole, seigniorage represents less
than one quarter of 1 per cent of GDP. He puts forward a methodology to assess
the scal implications for the new EU members from central and eastern Europe of
joining the Euro area.
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countries.
We assume that there are two policies, scal and monetary policy,
which are controlled by the government and an independent central bank,
respectively. Concretely, the government chooses the tax rate and the
independent central bank chooses the ination rate, in order to minimise
the following loss functions, respectively:
LG =
1
2
 
2 + Gx
2 + G (g   g)2

; (3.3)
where G; G > 0 and g  0; and
LCB =
1
2
 
2 + CBx
2 + CB (g   g)2

; (3.4)
where CB > 0 and CB  0:
We assume that both policymakers wish to minimise the deviations of
ination, output and public spending from some targets, i.e., 0, 0 and g;
respectively. Without loss of generality, the ination target is normalised
to zero. The output target level is also normalised to zero, which is the
natural output level reached in the absence of tax distortions and shocks
whenever the price level is correctly anticipated by the private sector.
Even though the targets are identical for both authorities, -as suggested
by Dixit and Lambertini (2003), their weights may di¤er.
The weights in the loss functions adopt di¤erent values in the litera-
ture. For instance, some authors like Debelle and Fischer (1994), Berger
et al. (2001) and Hefeker (2010), assume that CB = 0. Alesina and
Tabellini (1987) assume that CB < G and CB < G. In Huang and
Wei (2006) and Dimakou (2013), the weights for both authorities are
identical, except the weight attributed to ination. Concretely, Huang
and Wei (2006) assume the following loss functions:
LG =
1
2

2 + Gx
2 + G (g   g)2

and
LCB =
1
2

S2 + Gx
2 + G (g   g)2

:
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Thus, in their model CB = GS and CB =
G
S
, where S denotes the
weight on the ination rate placed by the central banker. In particular,
in their model G
G
= CB
CB
: This means that both authorities have the
same relative interest in output over spending stabilisation. The general
framework presented in this chapter encompasses all the models in this
literature.
The timing of events will be as follows. First of all, expectations and
thus, wages, are set. Afterwards, the shock " occurs. Finally, the mon-
etary and scal instruments will be simultaneously chosen. The model
is solved by minimising the loss function of the policymakers, holding e
constant and then imposing rational expectations.
It is shown in the Appendix that with rational expectations and min-
imising the governments and central banks loss functions, the tax and
ination rates are given by
  = 
G
G + 
2G + k
g +
G + k
G + 
2G + (+ k) 
" and (3.5)
 =

G + 
2G + k
g    
G + 
2G + (+ k) 
"; (3.6)
where  = GCB + kGCB: Moreover, it follows that
g   g = G

 and (3.7)
0  x = G

: (3.8)
Taxes and the ination rate depend positively on the target for public
spending, but are a¤ected in opposite ways by the shocks. The presence
of a positive supply shock on output will lead the scal authority to
raise the tax rate and the monetary authority to have less incentive to
inate. Further, output and public spending will be negatively a¤ected
by ination. In equilibrium, output and public spending are below their
targets (0 and g; respectively). The higher the need to nance the public
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spending (i.e. an increase in g), the further away are ination, output
and public spending from their respective targets.
3.3 Central Bank Conservativeness with Cor-
ruption and Seigniorage
In this section, we will dene a measure of the relative conservativeness of
the central bank with respect to the government when there is corruption
and seigniorage. We will also study the design of the monetary institution
such that social welfare is maximised.
3.3.1 Conservativeness Indicator
The term conservativeness refers to the degree of a central banks ina-
tion aversion. In the literature, di¤erent measures of conservativeness
have been used. Rogo¤ (1985) denes a "conservative" central banker
as one that would care relatively more about ination and less about
output than the scal authority. For Alesina and Tabellini (1987), the
central bank is conservative when CB < G and CB < G in the Ex-
pressions (3.3) and (3.4). Berger et al. (2001), Huang and Wei (2006),
and Dimakou (2013) assume that the central banker is more averse to in-
ation than the government when (s)he places a greater weight on price
stability than does the government, whereas the remaining weights of
the loss functions coincide for both authorities. Huang and Wei (2006)
and Dimakou (2013) measure the degree of conservativeness of the cen-
tral banker by the excess weight he or she places on the ination term
relative to the governments.
We will introduce an indicator of the conservativeness of the central
bank in the presence of corruption and seigniorage, which will encompass
all the measures of conservativeness previously mentioned.
Denition. The relative degree of conservativeness of the central
bank with respect to the conservativeness of the government, c, is dened
as:
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c =
+ k
 CB
G
+ k CB
G
: (3.9)
Remark 1. This indicator is the weighted harmonic mean of the
relative weights of the central bank with respect to the weights of the
government in their loss functions. Moreover, note that whenever c is
higher than 1 ( c lower than 1), the central bank is relatively more (less)
conservative than the government.
The following cases will clarify the possible values that the indicator
of the relative degree of conservativeness can take:
1) When both authorities have the same preferences, CB = G and
CB = G, then c = 1.
2 Thus, in this case both authorities have the
same degree of conservativeness, i.e., the central bank is as conservative
as the government.
2) If CB  G and CB  G and at least one of the previous
inequalities is strict, then the central bank is more conservative than the
government in Alesina and Tabellinis sense. In this case, c > 1; i.e., the
central bank is more conservative than the government.
3) If CB = G; then c > 1 is equivalent to CB < G, and in this
case, the indicator of conservativeness we consider and the one proposed
by Rogo¤ coincide.
4) If CB = GS and CB =
G
S
(as in Huang and Weis model, 2006),
then c = S. Huang and Wei (2006) propose as a measure of conserva-
tiveness S 1. Thus, both indicators are equivalent.
5) If  = 0; i.e., there is complete corruption, then c = G
CB
. Notice
that when  = 0; as the government does not obtain any revenue through
taxes, it will set a tax rate such that the output deviation is null. In this
case, conservativeness will be determined by the public spending weights,
which will determine whether ination will be high or low.
Proposition 1. Delegation of monetary policy to an independent and
"conservative enough" authority (c >1) reduces the expected ination and
2This case would also coincide with the government being in control of monetary
policy, as the central bank would be minimizing the governments loss function.
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the variance of ination, but increases the expected value and the variance
of the deviations of output and public spending from their targets.
The results derived in Proposition 1 are in line with the related lit-
erature (see, among others, Rogo¤, 1985; Debelle and Fischer, 1994). In
addition, this proposition shows that the proposed measure of conserva-
tiveness of the central bank is e¤ective in the sense that a higher degree
of c lowers both the expected value and the variability of ination.
3.3.2 Welfare Analysis under Corruption and Seignior-
age
In this subsection we will study how conservative should an independent
central bank be from the societys welfare point of view. In order to
study the optimal degree of conservativeness of the central bank, we will
consider, as in Debelle and Fischer (1994),3 the following general loss
function for the society:
LS =
1
2
 
2 + Sx
2 + S (g   g)2

; (3.10)
where S > 0 and S  0.
The problem consists in nding CB and CB that minimise the soci-
etys expected loss function. Therefore, we have
min
CB ;CB
E [LS] :
In the Appendix it is shown that
3Debelle and Fischer (1994), in a model similar to Alesina and Tabellinis, analyse
how conservative should a central bank be. They show that the optimal degree of
conservatism of the central bank depends on the societys aversion to ination and
output uctuations.
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E [LS] = 

 
1
D1(c)
g
2
+


D2(c)
2
2"
!
(3.11) 
1 + S

c
(+ k) G
2
+ S

c
(+ k) G
2!
;
where 
 = 1
2
(+ k)2 2G
2
G; with
D1(c) = c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k) kGG and
D2(c) = c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k)2 GG:
This expression indicates that the parameters CB and CB a¤ect the
societys welfare through c. Therefore, the problem of nding the optimal
relative weights, i.e., CB and CB, that maximise the societys welfare
is reduced to obtaining the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of
the central bank. Formally,
min
c
E [LS] : (3.12)
Proposition 2. There exists a unique value of c, denoted by c,
that maximises societys welfare. When  > 0, c 2  ; +k
k


where
 =
GG(G+2G)
2GS+
22GS
and, when  = 0; c = G
S
.
Remark 2. The extremes of the interval stated in Proposition 2 are
achieved when 2" takes an extreme value. Concretely, when 
2
" ! 1,
then c !  and when 2" = 0, then c = +kk : Notice that this proposi-
tion provides a generalisation of Huang and Weis results (2006), since
these authors focus on the case 2" = 0. Huang and Wei (2006) show
that S =  + 1: Using this optimal value and taking into account that
in their model CB = GS and CB =
G
S
, the optimal values obtained
by these authors result in a degree of relative conservativeness equal to
 + 1; which coincides with the one derived in Proposition 2 (since in
their model k = 1). Therefore, this analysis shows the robustness of the
results derived by Huang and Wei (2006). Notice however that by al-
lowing for incomplete seigniorage, the degree of conservativeness derived
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here is higher than theirs as long as k < 1. However, it is important
to point out that there are other alternative values that achieve the same
degree of conservativeness and, therefore, our result is more general. For
instance, we could consider the case where CB = 0 and 

CB =
k

G.
Proposition 2 shows that the optimal degree of conservativeness of the
central bank is bounded, in a similar way as in Rogo¤ (1985), where the
central bank could not be innitely conservative. Further, it depends on
parameter values that represent the preferences of the government and
society over ination, output and public spending stabilisation. Notice
that, contrary to Rogo¤s ndings, there will be parameter values for
which it will be optimal to design a central bank that is less conservative
than government. For instance, this will occur when  > 0; whenever
+k
k
 < 1; i.e., whenever S or S are high enough. Moreover, when
there is complete corruption ( = 0) and society places a higher weight
on public spending stabilisation than the government (G < S), the
central bank should be less conservative than the scal authority. Given
that under complete corruption c = G
CB
and c = G
S
; then, it follows
that in the optimal CB = S: Nonetheless, when  = 0 and when the
governments and societys preferences coincide, Proposition 2 implies
that c = 1, i.e., the central bank has to be as conservative as society
when there is full corruption.
In what follows we focus on  > 0 and we assume that the scal au-
thority shares the same preferences as society (i.e., G = S; G = S).
This has been justied in the literature given that the government has
been elected by society and would be representing societys preferences.
In the following corollary, we show how the optimal degree of conserva-
tiveness varies with some parameter values.
Corollary 3. When the government shares the same preferences as
society, then the optimal relative degree of conservativeness of the central
bank satises that c 2  1; +k
k

: Moreover, the following comparative
static results hold:
a) c is decreasing in 2",
b) c is increasing in g;
c) c is decreasing in k; and
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d) c is increasing in  whenever 2" is low enough. The opposite result
may arise when 2" is high enough.
Corollary 3 shows that when the governments and societys prefer-
ences coincide and there is a certain degree of corruption, the central
bank should be at least as conservative as the government. Moreover,
we have derived several comparative statics results. In particular, the
higher the volatility of supply shocks (2"), the less conservative should
the central bank be in order to stabilise output. Further, the higher the
public spending target (g), the higher the expected ination and, thus,
the more conservative the central bank would have to be.
In addition, if seigniorage decreases, the central bank should be more
conservative. The intuition behind this result is that, in economies with
little seigniorage, the e¤ect of an increase in conservativeness on the de-
viations of output and spending will be negligible. On the other hand,
when seigniorage is important, the trade o¤ between a reduction of ex-
pected ination and the increase in the deviations of output and spending
becomes relevant. Consequently, the central bank should be more con-
servative when seigniorage is not important.
Finally, when shocks are not signicant and there is more corruption
(i.e., a decrease in ), the central bank should be less conservative. In-
tuitively, if the institutional quality is poorer, there will be less resources
available for the government through taxes. Thus, the government will
need to collect nancing resources through seigniorage and for that reason
the central bank should be more accommodative and less conservative.
However, the opposite result may arise when 2" is high enough. Notice
that the higher the volatility of shocks, not only the variance of devia-
tions of output and public spending will be higher, but also the variance
of ination. This will lead to some instances (for instance, when k > )
where the central bank will need to be more conservative. Following
Alesina and Stella (2010), a high value of 2" is an alternative way of
thinking of a major nancial crisis. Therefore, in the case of a major
crisis, there are some instances that the central bank should be more
conservative when the level of corruption increases.
Next, we are interested, from a normative point of view, in nding the
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optimal relative weights of the central banks preferences. By solving the
optimisation problem stated in (3.12), we look for the relationship that
the optimal values of CB and CB must satisfy. Therefore, without any
loss of generality, as the relevant variable in the optimisation problem of
societys welfare is c, we can interpret that we have a degree of freedom
when choosing the optimal values of CB and CB: Consequently, we can
suppose that CB = 0; like Debelle and Fischer (1994) and Berger et al.
(2001).4 In this case, the following corollary applies:
Corollary 4. If the governments and societys preferences coin-
cide and public spending is not included in the preferences of the central
bank (CB = 0), the optimal relative weight of output satises 

CB 2
k

G;
+k

G

:
In this case, in economies where institutional quality is particularly
low (i.e., k > ), the central bank should be less conservative than
the government and society in the Rogo¤ sense (i.e., the central bank
should give more importance to output stabilisation than the govern-
ment). However, we cannot conclude that the central bank should be
less conservative in this case, since c > 1 as Corollary 3 shows. From a
normative point of view, we could then justify that public spending does
not need to be included in the loss function of the monetary authority,
but the consequence of this is that the socially optimal value of CB has
to be higher than k

G.
3.4 Conclusions
This chapter has studied the e¤ect of institutional quality and seigniorage
on the design of an independent and conservative central bank. To that
end, Alesina and Tabellinis model (1987) has been extended to include
corruption by postulating a connection between the governments scal
4The advantage of the general model presented here over models that impose
restrictions on the parameters is that it allows to study many congurations of pref-
erences. For instante, Huang and Weis model could not handle the case CB = 0:
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capacity and the quality of institutions and to allow di¤erent degrees of
seigniorage.
In terms of the optimal design of an independent and conservative
central bank, we have carried out a welfare analysis by introducing a
measure of the degree of conservativeness of the central bank with re-
spect to the government and we have characterised its optimal social
value. It is shown that one can design a central bank that cares about
public spending, besides output and ination. A central bank could
equally not care about public spending, but then the optimal weight on
output stabilisation would have to be higher. Moreover, when the pref-
erences of the government and society coincide, then the central bank
should be more conservative than the government, except in the case of
complete corruption. In this case, both policymakers should be equally
conservative.
Finally, when the shocks a¤ecting the economy are not very signi-
cant, the optimal value of conservativeness decreases in the level of cor-
ruption. Notice, however, that this result may reverse when the economy
is a¤ected by volatile shocks, as in crisis times. Besides, if the degree
of seigniorage decreases, the central bank should be more conservative.
Therefore, if the variability of shocks is not important, then economies
with higher levels of corruption and seigniorage should not design central
banks that are too conservative. Two further extensions can be made:
rst, we could empirically estimate the parameters of the model and
test the implications presented here and second, we could endogenise
corruption and study the reverse connection, from conservativeness to
corruption.
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Appendix
Proof of Expressions (3.5) and (3.6). If we substitute the Expres-
sions (3.1) and (3.2) into (3.3) and (3.4), we obtain
LG =
1
2
 
2 + G (   e    + ")2 + G ( + k   g)2

and
LCB =
1
2
 
2 + CB (   e    + ")2 + CB ( + k   g)2

:
The rst-order condition of the governments optimisation problem is
given by
@LG
@
=  G (   e    + ") + G ( + k   g) = 0;
and hence,
 =
(G   kG)    G (e   ") + Gg
G + 
2G
: (3.13)
For the central bank, the rst-order condition implies that
@LCB
@
=  + CB (   e    + ") + kCB ( + k   g) = 0;
or equivalently,
 =
CB (
e +    ")  kCB (   g)
1 + CB + k2CB
: (3.14)
Plugging the Expression (3.13) into (3.14), it follows that
 =
(g +  (e   ")) 
G + 
2G + (+ k) 
; (3.15)
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where  = GCB +kGCB: Taking expectations in the previous equal-
ity and solving for e, we get
e =

G + 
2G + k
g: (3.16)
Substituting the Expression of e given in (3.16) into (3.15), we have
 =

G + 
2G + k
g    
G + 
2G + (+ k) 
": (3.17)
Using the Expressions (3.16) and (3.17) in (3.13), and after some algebra,
we obtain
  = 
G
G + 
2G + k
g +
G + k
G + 
2G + (+ k) 
":
Proof of Expressions (3.7) and (3.8). The rst-order condition
of the governments optimisation problem can be rewritten as
x =  G
G
(g   g) : (3.18)
Analogously, for the central bank, we have
 + CBx+ kCB (g   g) = 0:
Using the Expression (3.18), it follows that
g   g = G

: (3.19)
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Hence,
0  x = G

: (3.20)
Proof of Expression (3.11). Substituting the Expressions (3.7)
and (3.8) into (3.10), we get
LS =
1
2
 
2 + S

G


2
+ S

G


2!
;
or equivalently,
LS =
1
2
2
 
1 + S

c
(+ k) G
2
+ S

c
(+ k) G
2!
;
since
 =
(+ k) GG
c
: (3.21)
Taking expectations, we get
E [LS] =
1
2
E
 
2
 
1 + S

c
(+ k) G
2
+ S

c
(+ k) G
2!
:
Moreover, using the Expression(3.21) in (3.6), we obtain
 =
(+ k) GG
D1(c)
g    (+ k) GG
D2(c)
",
where
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D1(c) = c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k) kGG and
D2(c) = c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k)2 GG:
Hence,
E
 
2

= (E ())2+var () =

(+ k) GG
D1(c)
g
2
+

 (+ k) GG
D2(c)
2
2":
Using this expression in the last formula for E [LS] ; direct computations
yield
E [LS] = 

 
1
D1(c)
g
2
+


D2(c)
2
2"
!
 
1 + S

c
(+ k) G
2
+ S

c
(+ k) G
2!
;
where 
 = 1
2
(+ k)2 2G
2
G:
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that E() = (+k)GG
c(G+2G)+(+k)kGG
g
and var () =

(+k)GG
c(G+2G)+(+k)2GG
2
2": Moreover, taking into ac-
count the Expressions (3.19), (3.20) and (3.21), it follows that
E (0  x) = cG
c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k) kGG
g;
var (0  x) = c
242G 
c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k)2 GG
22";
E (g   g) = cG
c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k) kGG
g and
var (g   g) = c
222G 
c
 
G + 
2G

+ (+ k)2 GG
22":
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Di¤erentiating these expressions, we have that @
@c
E() < 0; @
@c
var() < 0;
@
@c
E (0  x) > 0; @
@c
E (g   g) > 0; @
@c
var (0  x) > 0 and @
@c
var (g   g) >
0:
Proof of Proposition 2. Lets minimise the expected value of the
loss function for society
min
c
E [LS] :
The rst-order condition of this optimisation problem is given by
@E [LS]
@c
=
2

 
22GS + 
2
GS

(+ k) GG

kc  (+ k) 
(D1(c))
3 g
2 + 2 (+ k)
c  
(D2(c))
3
2
"

= 0;
(3.22)
where
 =
GG
 
G + 
2G

2GS + 
22GS
:
Thus, we can distinguish two cases:
Case A:  = 0: In this case, from the Expression (3.22) we get that
c =  = G
S
:
Case B:  > 0: Note that if c > +k
k
; then @
@c
E [LS] > 0: Otherwise,
if c < ; then @
@c
E [LS] < 0: Hence, we know that there exists a value of c
belonging to the interval
 
; +k
k


that satises the rst-order condition.
In relation to the second-order condition note that
@2E[LS ]
@2c
=  2
(
22GS+
2
GS)
(+k)GG

(G+2G)(2ck 3(+k)) (+k)k2GG
(D1(c))
4 g2+
+2 (+ k)
(G+2G)(2c 3) (+k)2GG
(D2(c))
4 2"

:
In a value of c that satises the rst-order condition, it holds that
g2 =  2 (+ k) (c  ) (D1(c))
3
(kc  (+ k) ) (D2(c))3
2": (3.23)
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Using the Expression (3.23) in the expression of @
2E[LS ]
@2c
, we get
@2E [LS]
@2c
=
2
3
 
22GS + 
2
GS

p(c)
((+ k)    kc) GG (D1(c)) (D2(c))4
2";
where p(c) = p2c2 + p1c+ p0; with
p2 =
 
G + 
2G
  

 
G + 
2G
  3 (+ k) kGG ;
p1 = 4 (+ k) (+ 2k) GG
 
G + 
2G

and
p0 = (+ k)
2 GG
  3  G + 2G+ (+ k) kGG :
Now, we distinguish two cases:
Case 1: If
 

 
G + 
2G
  3 (+ k) kGG < 0; then we conclude
that p(c) has a root strictly higher than +k
k
 and another root strictly
smaller than  since p() > 0 and p(+k
k
) > 0:
Case 2: If
 

 
G + 
2G
  3 (+ k) kGG  0; then p(c) is in-
creasing in the interval
 
; +k
k


: Moreover, in this case it also holds
p() > 0:
Therefore, in both cases we conclude that p(c) > 0 whenever c 2 
; +k
k


: Consequently, it follows that in a value of c that satises the
rst-order condition, @
2
@2c
E [LS] > 0: This guarantees that the value c that
solves the rst-order condition is unique and it is a minimum.
Proof of Corollary 3. a) When the preferences of the government
and society coincide  = 1: In this case, from the rst-order condition,
we know that c satises
F (c; 2") = 0;
where
F (c; 2") =

kc  (+ k)
(D1(c))
3 g
2 + 2 (+ k)
c  1
(D2(c))
3
2
"

:
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In addition, from the second-order condition, it follows that @F
@c
(c; 2") >
0: Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we get
sign

@c
@2"

=  sign

@F
@2"
(c; 2")

:
Moreover, notice that
@F
@2"
(c; 2") = 
2 (+ k)
c   1
(D2(c))
3 :
As c > 1, we can conclude that @F
@2"
(c; 2") > 0; and hence,
@c
@2"
< 0:
b) In this case, from the rst-order condition, we know that c satises
F (c; g) = 0;
where
F (c; g) =
kc  (+ k)
(D1(c))
3 g
2 + 2 (+ k)
c  1
(D2(c))
3
2
":
Besides, from the second-order condition, it follows that @F
@c
(c; g) > 0:
Combining this result and the Implicit Function Theorem, we get
sign

@c
@g

=  sign

@F
@g
(c; g)

:
In addition, after some algebra, it follows that
@F
@g
(c; g) = 2
kc   (+ k)
(D1(c))
3 g;
As 1 < c < +k
k
; it follows that @F
@g
(c; g) < 0: This allows us to conclude
that @c

@g
> 0:
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c) Note that, from the rst-order condition, we know that c satises
F (c; k) = 0;
where
F (c; k) =

kc  (+ k)
(D1(c))
3 g
2 + 2 (+ k)
c  1
(D2(c))
3
2
"

:
In addition, from the second-order condition, it follows that @F
@c
(c; k) > 0:
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we get
sign

@c
@k

=  sign

@F
@k
(c; k)

:
Furthermore, after some algebra, it follows that
@F
@k
(c; k) =

(G+2G)c2 (G+2G+(2+5k)kGG)c+(+k)(3+5k)GG
(D1(c))
4 g2+
(c  1)2 (G+
2G)c 5(+k)2GG
(D2(c))
4 2"

;
and from the Expression (3.23), 2" =   (ck (+k))(D2(c))
3
2(+k)(c 1)(D1(c))3 g
2: Substituting
this formula in the previous equality and operating
@F
@k
(c; k) =

 
G + 
2G
2
q

GG
G+
2G

(+ k) (D1(c))
4 (D2(c))
g2;
where
q(z) = (+ k)3 (3 (+ k)  2ck) z2+(+ k) ( 3 (+ k) c + (+ 5k)) cz+c3:
Next, we distinguish two cases: k   and k < :
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Case 1: k  : In this case, 1  3(+k)
+5k
: Using the expression of
q(z), for all c  1  3(+k)
+5k
q(z) > 0 whenever z > 0, which implies that
@F
@k
(c) > 0:
Case 2: k < : In this case, 1 < 3(+k)
+5k
< +k
k
: First, doing a
similar reasoning as in Case 1, we conclude that @F
@k
(c) > 0 whenever
c  3(+k)
+5k
: Now, suppose that 1  c < 3(+k)
+5k
: From direct computations,
the minimum of q(z) is z =  c(+k)( 3(+k)+c(+5k))
2(+k)3(3(+k) 2ck) and q(z) > 0; as k < 
and 1  c < 3(+k)
+5k
: Consequently, in this case it is also true that q(z) > 0
whenever z > 0 and, hence, @F
@k
(c; k) > 0:
d) Finally, we rewrite the rst-order condition as follows:
F (c; ) = 0;
where
F (c; ) =

kc  (+ k)
(D1(c))
3 g
2 + 2 (+ k)
c  1
(D2(c))
3
2
"

:
Besides, from the second-order condition, it follows that @F
@c
(c; ) > 0:
Applying the Implicit Function Theorem, we get
sign

@c
@

=  sign

@F
@
(c; )

:
Moreover, after some algebra, it follows that
@F
@
(c; ) =

 6kc
2G+(G (5+6k)G+3k2GG)c 2(+k)kGG
(D1(c))
4 g2+
 (c  1) ((3+2k)G 
2(3+4k)G)c ((+k)2(3 2k)GG)
(D2(c))
4 2"

;
and from the Expression (3.23), 2" =   (ck (+k))(D2(c))
3
2(+k)(c 1)(D1(c))3 g
2: Substituting
this formula in the previous equality and operating
@F
@
(c; ) =
q(c)
 (+ k)D2(c) (D1(c))
4 g
2; (3.24)
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where
q(c) = q3c
3 + q2c
2 + q1c+ q0;
with
q3 =   (3+ 2k) k
 
G + 
2G
2
;
q2 = (+ k)

2 (+ k)
 
G + 
2G
2
 kGG
  
5k   32 + 4k2 G + 2  11k + 32 + 4k2 G ;
q1 = (+ k)
2 GG
 
(3+ 4k) kG + 2
2
 
2G   2G

+k
 
2 (9+ 4k)  2 (+ k) k2G

G

and
q0 = (+ k)
4 (2k   ) k2G2G:
Note that
q

+ k
k

< 0 and
q(1) = 32
 
2G + 
42G + 2
2GG + 8
4G
2
G

+
 (k   )  (+ k)3 k2G2G + 22  6k + 112 + k2 G2G
+42G + 2 (+ k) (2+ k) 
2
GG + 2
2GG + 
2
G

:
Combining these results and the Expression (3.24), we can conclude
that if 2" is low enough, as c
 is close to +k
k
; then @F
@
(c; ) < 0; and
hence, @c

@
> 0: In contrast, if 2" is high enough, then c
 is close to
1. Notice that there are parameter congurations (for instance, k > )
such that q(1) > 0; which implies that @F
@
(c; ) > 0; and hence, @c

@
< 0:
Consequently, we show that @c

@
< 0 may hold when 2" is high enough.
Proof of Corollary 4. This is omitted since it immediately follows
from Corollary 3.
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Chapter 4
The E¤ects of Corruption in a
Monetary Union
4.1 Introduction
The last anti-corruption report from the European Commission shows
that corruption costs around 120 billion euros per year to the European
Union economy. Additionally, it reects that corruption varies from one
Member State to another. According to the corruption perception in-
dex from Transparency International, in the European Monetary Union
(EMU), Finland was the cleanest country in 2014. By contrast, Italy and
Greece were the most corrupt countries. Apart from them, Cyprus, Por-
tugal, Spain and Slovakia, among others, were below the EMU average.
Concretely, Italy and Greece were below the global world average.1
Academic papers do not usually analyse the e¤ects of corruption in
one country on another country. Therefore, our research question here
is the following: does it matter, in an economic sense, whether a corrupt
country a¤ects other Member State in a monetary union? In this chapter,
we study how the degree of corruption in one country would a¤ect its
own economy as well as that of the other country. To the best of our
knowledge, the consequence of this question has not been examined. This
chapter aims to ll this void.
1See Fig. 4.3 in the Appendix.
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In the monetary union presented here, there are two countries. We de-
note by country 1 the country with a corrupt government and by country
2 the country with a completely e¢ cient government. In this context, we
explore (i) how corruption in country 1 a¤ects the main macroeconomic
variables in both countries, and more importantly, (ii) how country 1
may compensate the other country in case that corruption generates a
negative externality to country 2.
We obtain several interesting results from the analysis. First, an
increase in the degree of corruption always leads to a decrease in the
public spending of country 1 (the corrupt country). Moreover, corruption
may increase or decrease the output growth rate of country 1 and it
may increase or decrease the monetary authoritys desire to inate; it
will depend on how far the government of country 1 is concerned about
stabilising its public spending. However, corruption has no e¤ect on
the output nor the public spending of country 2. Second, depending
also on how far the government of country 1 is concerned about public
spending stabilisation, both countries may be better o¤ or worse o¤with
an increase in the level of corruption. In particular, if the government
of country 1 is su¢ ciently concerned about public spending stabilisation,
both countries are worse o¤ with corruption. Third, as country 2 may
be damaged by the degree of corruption, country 1 could be forced by
country 2 to decrease its public spending target in order to compensate
country 2 for the negative externality. In this case, country 2 would be
better o¤ but country 1 may be worse o¤ if country 1 is very concerned
about stabilising its public spending.
This chapter is linked to three literatures. The rst one focuses on
corruption in a monetary union, and the closest paper to ours is Hefekers
(2010). However, we allow for more asymmetries between countries since
in our framework all the authorities have di¤erent preferences, there are
di¤erent output target levels between countries and there is only one
country with a corrupt government. Besides, we model corruption as a
share of tax revenue and our purpose is to analyse the e¤ects of corruption
on both countries. Hefeker (2010) focuses on the implications of a move
from a national autonomy to a monetary union. He nds that, under
some conditions, taxes decrease and ination, output and public spending
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increase. Besides, he obtains that if the new member country brings a
large nance gap and a high level of corruption into the monetary union,
the common central bank sets a higher ination.
The second strand of related literature deals with how corruption is
modeled. In that regard, we follow Huang and Wei (2006). They nd
that corruption can make a country better o¤ if its government is unable
to make binding commitments and assigns a larger weight to output than
to ination stabilisation. Although these authors focus on the e¤ects of
institutional quality on monetary and scal policies in only one country,
they do not set their analysis in a monetary union.
The third branch of literature looks at asymmetries between coun-
tries, as in Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and Beetsma and Giuliodori
(2010). By contrast to them, we include corruption and we consider that
scal authorities are concerned about their public spending stabilisation.
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) study the interaction of monetary and scal
policies in a monetary union. They nd that if there is an agreement
about ideal output and ination, a monetary-scal symbiosis is created.
Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010) study the macroeconomic costs and ben-
ets of monetary unication. They explore, among other things, how
conicts between the scal authorities and the European Central Bank
about the macroeconomic objectives may produce a race among the pol-
icymakers.
The chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 sets up the model.
Section 4.3 studies the e¤ects of corruption on the main macroeconomic
variables of both countries. Concluding remarks are presented in Section
4.4 and proofs are gathered in the Appendix.
4.2 The Model
In this section we extend the analysis of Hefeker (2010) to allow for more
asymmetry between countries, i.e., di¤erent preferences on the authori-
tiesobjectives and di¤erent output target levels among countries.
We assume that there are two member countries and a common cen-
tral bank in a monetary union. Each country i; i = 1; 2; has a scal
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authority who selects the scal policy variable in each country, the tax
rate. Besides, the common central bank chooses a monetary policy vari-
able, the ination rate. Ination is equal across the monetary union.
The output function for country i is a simplied Lucas supply function
and it is described by
xi =    e    i; (4.1)
where xi denotes output in country i,  is the actual common ination
rate, e is the expected ination rate and  i represents the taxes levied
on output in country i.
The scal authorities face the following budget constraints:
g1 =  1 and (4.2)
g2 =  2; (4.3)
where gi denotes the ratio of public expenditures over output in country
i.2 Note that the only source of nancing the public spending of both
countries is by their taxes, as in Acocella et al. (2007a).3 Moreover,
the degree of corruption is represented by the parameter  (0    1).
In contrast to Hefeker (2010) and following Huang and Wei (2006), the
degree of corruption is modeled as follows: the private sector pays taxes,
 i; but only  1 is collected by the government of country 1. Thus, when
 = 0; there is full corruption in the economy in country 1 and the tax
revenues are "eaten up", whereas when  = 1; there is no corruption and
all tax revenues are collected as in country 2. Therefore, country 1 has a
weaker institution than country 2 since there is a leakage of tax revenue in
country 1. In consequence, we assume also asymmetry between countries
through their public spending.
2The derivation of Expressions (4.1), (4.2) and (4.3) is omitted since it is analo-
gous to the derivation of Expressions (2.1) and (2.2) in Chapter 2 (included in the
Appendix).
3However, Acocella et al. (2007a) assume that all countries do not su¤er from
revenue leakage.
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We assume that both scal authorities wish to minimise the deviations
of ination, output and public spending from their targets (0, xi and gi,
respectively). Moreover, as in Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998), Beetsma
and Bovenberg (2001), and Acocella et al. (2007b), the common central
bank is concerned with avoiding the deviation of ination and stabilising
the average output growth in the union.4 Thus, the scal authority
in country i and the monetary authority CCB want to minimise their
respective loss functions dened by
Li =
1
2

2 + i (xi   xi)2 + i (gi   gi)2

; (4.4)
where i; i > 0 and xi; gi  0; and
LCCB =
1
2

2 + CCB (zx1 + (1  z)x2   (zx1 + (1  z) x2))2

; (4.5)
where CCB > 0 and 0 < z < 1: Countries in the monetary union have a
relative share, z for country 1 and 1 z for country 2. The parameters 0s
and 0s measure the weights of the output and public spending objectives
relative to the weight of the ination objective. Following Dixit and Lam-
bertini (2001) and Beetsma and Giuliodori (2010), we allow disagreement
among the authorities regarding their relative weights. Specically, the
disagreement is between countries (1 6= 2 and/or 1 6= 2) and between
countries and the monetary authority (i 6= CCB). It is worth mention-
ing that both papers presume that scal authorities are not worried about
their public spending. However, we follow Alesina and Tabellini (1987),
Beetsma and Bovenberg (1997), and Huang and Wei (2006), among oth-
ers, who assume that scal authorities take into account their public
goods provision.
4Following the related literature, - see Alesina and Tabellini (1987), Debelle and
Fischer (1994), Alesina and Stella (2010), among others - we assume that the ination
target () of the authorities has been normalised to zero since e.g., the ECBs ination
target is below 2%. The results would not be qualitatively altered by assuming a
positive ination target.
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In the previous loss functions, the parameters xi and gi represent the
output and public spending targets in country i, respectively. Allow-
ing di¤erent output and spending targets reects heterogeneity between
countries as in Dixit and Lambertini (2001) and Hefeker and Zimmer
(2011). In what follows, we will assume that x1
g1
< 1
1
and x2
g2
< 2
2
given
that these inequalities guarantee that the equilibrium values of public
spending rates are positive.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Rational expectations are formed.
2. The scal and monetary authorities choose simultaneously their
policy variables,  i and ; respectively.
The model is solved by backward induction. From the rst-order con-
ditions of the authoritiesoptimisation problems, we obtain the following
reaction functions:
 1 =
g1

 
1
1


2 + 1
1
 (x1 + g1) + 11
2 + 1
1
(   e) , (4.6)
 2 = g2  
2
2
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2) +
2
2
1 + 2
2
(   e) and (4.7)
 =
CCB
1 + CCB
(e + z ( 1 + x1) + (1  z) ( 2 + x2)) : (4.8)
Imposing rational expectations and, then, solving the system of three
equations and three unknowns ( 1;  2 and ), we obtain the following
proposition:
Proposition 1. In equilibrium, the tax and ination rates are as follows:
 1 =
  1
1
x1 + g1
2 + 1
1
; (4.9)
 2 =
  2
2
x2 + g2
1 + 2
2
; and (4.10)
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 = z
CCB
2 + 1
1
(x1 + g1) + (1  z) CCB
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2) : (4.11)
Moreover, using the Expressions (4.9) and (4.10), it follows that, in
equilibrium, the values of output and public spending rates are given by
x1 =
1
1
x1   g1
2 + 1
1
; (4.12)
x2 =
2
2
x2   g2
1 + 2
2
, (4.13)
g1 = 
  1
1
x1 + g1
2 + 1
1
; and (4.14)
g2 =
  2
2
x2 + g2
1 + 2
2
: (4.15)
Table 4.1 captures the e¤ects of parameters on ination, output and
public spending for both countries.
x1 x2 g1 g2 CCB 1 1 2 2
Inflation + + + + +   +   +
Output1 + 0   0 0 +   0 0
Output2 0 + 0   0 0 0 +  
Gov: Spending1   0 + 0 0   + 0 0
Gov: Spending2 0   0 + 0 0 0 +  
Table 4.1: E¤ects of preference changes in ination, output and public
spending for both countries.
Note that an increase in xi creates more incentives for the central
bank to inate (see Expression 4.11). Besides, the scal authority of
country i decreases its tax rate in order to be closer to its output target
(see the Expressions 4.9 and 4.10). As a result, the reduction in tax rates
gives rise to an increase in the output level of country i and a decrease
in its public spending. Notice that in this basic model an increase in
xi has no e¤ect on the behaviour of the other scal authority (see the
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Expressions 4.9 and 4.10). Hence, the changes in xi do not a¤ect the
output and the public spending of the other country.
Moreover, an increase in gi means that taxes in country i are increased
and, thus, its output decreases and its public spending increases. The
behaviour of the scal authority of country i of raising its taxes leads
to an increase in the incentives of the central bank to inate. Note that
the increase in the ination rate is predicted by price-setters and then
output of country i is only a¤ected by the change in its tax rate.
Now, we want to derive the implications of preference changes for
the monetary and scal authorities (CCB, i and i, respectively) on
the main macroeconomic variables. Firstly, we examine the e¤ects of
the monetary authoritys preferences. Ination depends positively on the
common central banks weight on output, i.e., CCB: The central bank
faces a trade-o¤ between stabilisation ination and output: the higher
the relative weight given to output stabilisation by the common central
bank, the greater the incentives to inate by the central bank. However,
the output growth and public spending rates of both countries are not
a¤ected by the changes in CCB. As we have mentioned previously, the
increase in the ination rate is predicted by price-setters and then output
and public spending of country i are only a¤ected by the change in its
tax rate (see the Expressions 4.6 and 4.7).
Secondly, we study how changes in i a¤ect the strategic behaviours of
the three authorities. If i is higher, which means that the scal author-
ity of country i gives relatively more weight to its output stabilisation,
then this scal authority decreases its tax rate in order to be closer to
its output target, and hence, its output increases and its public spend-
ing decreases. From the point of view of the common central bank, if
the output rate of country i increases, the monetary authority has less
incentives to inate.
Thirdly, we analyse the e¤ects of i on the strategic behaviours of
the authorities. If i is higher, which means that the scal authority of
country i gives relatively more weight to its public spending stabilisation,
this scal authority raises its tax rate to be closer to its public spending
target, and hence, its output decreases and its public spending increases.
As the output rate of country i is decreasing, the monetary authority
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has more incentives to inate.
4.3 The E¤ects of the Degree of Corrup-
tion
After determining the equilibrium outcomes and studying the e¤ects of
target and preference changes, we now examine how the degree of cor-
ruption a¤ects the main variables of this model. The following corollary
summarises the impact of a change in  on output, public spending and
ination rates:
Corollary 2. In equilibrium:
a) as the degree of corruption of country 1 rises, the output of country 1
decreases and the ination rate increases if and only if 1 > 1; where
1 =
1(2x1+g1)
2g1
;
b) as the degree of corruption of country 1 rises, the public spending of
country 1 always decreases, and
c) the output and public spending of country 2 are not a¤ected by the
level of corruption of country 1.
Corollary 2 indicates that the e¤ects of corruption on both the output
growth rate of country 1 and the ination rate depend on how much the
scal authority of country 1 cares about stabilising its public spending
with respect to ination stabilisation (1). Specically, when the scal
authority of country 1 attaches a high relative weight to public spending
stabilisation (1 > 1), the output of country 1 decreases and the ina-
tion rate increases with the degree of corruption. On the other hand,
the opposite result holds whenever 1 < 1. In addition, Corollary 2b
suggests that an increase in the degree of corruption always leads to a
decrease in the public spending of country 1. Finally, Corollary 2c shows
that the output and public spending of country 2 are not a¤ected by
changes in corruption.
The rationale behind Corollary 2 is as follows. When the scal au-
thority of country 1 gives a high relative weight to public spending sta-
bilisation (1 > 1), an increase with the degree of corruption causes an
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increase in the tax rate of country 1. This raise in the tax rate increases
the incentive to inate by the central bank, as shown in the Expression
(4.8). As the increase in the ination rate is predicted by price-setters,
the output of country 1 is only a¤ected by the change in the tax rate
and, therefore, the output of country 1 decreases with the degree of cor-
ruption. Despite the increase in the tax rate due to an increase in the
degree of corruption, the public spending of country 1 always decreases
with the degree of corruption. This shows that the increase in the level
of corruption more than compensates for the increase in the tax rate of
country 1. On the other hand, if the scal authority of country 1 is not
really concerned about public spending stabilisation (1 < 1), it has an
incentive to decrease its tax rate when the level of corruption increases.
In this case, the output rate of country 1 increases and its public spend-
ing decreases. Therefore, the increase in output reduces the incentive to
inate by the central bank. Finally, as we saw in the previous section,
parameter changes in one country do not a¤ect the other and so, the de-
gree of corruption has no impact on the tax rate of country 2, as shown in
the Expression (4.10). Therefore, the output and public spending rates
of country 2 are independent of the degree of corruption.
The e¤ects of corruption on the main macroeconomic objectives are
summarised in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1: The e¤ects of the degree of corruption according to the rela-
tive weight on public spending of country 1.
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4.3.1 Welfare Implications
What is the e¤ect on welfare of both countries if the degree of corruption
of country 1 increases? To answer this question, we assume that the
governments losses coincide with societys losses. This is because if the
government has been elected by society, its preferences will be close to
the societys in order to be re-elected (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998;
Dixit and Lambertini, 2003). It is important to point out that even if
the degree of corruption has no impact on output or public spending in
country 2, it will a¤ect the losses of this country through its impact on
the ination rate.
In the next corollary, we show that the e¤ect of corruption on losses
generally depends on how far the scal authority of country 1 is concerned
about public spending stabilisation (1). If the scal authority of country
1 is not really concerned about public spending stabilisation (1 < ~1),
an increase in the degree of corruption favours both countries, whereas
the reverse result holds if 1 > 1.
Corollary 3. In equilibrium:
a) the losses in country 1 increase as the degree of corruption increases
if and only if 1 > ~1; where ~1 is characterised in the Appendix, with
~1 < 1;
5 and
b) the losses in country 2 increase as the degree of corruption increases
if and only if 1 > 1.
To intuitively understand the impact of an increase in the degree of
corruption on losses in both countries, notice that when institutional
quality worsens (a decrease in ) and the scal authority of country 1
gives a high relative weight to public spending stabilisation (1 > 1),
Corollary 2 shows that the ination rate goes up and, hence, we can
conclude that the losses in country 2 increase. Moreover, Corollary 2
also points out that the output and public spending rates of country 1
decrease in the degree of corruption, and therefore, the deviations from
their respective targets increase. Thus, we can also conclude that, in
5In the Appendix, ~1 is implicitly determined. This is the reason why we cannot
give the explicit expression of this threshold.
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this case, the losses in country 1 also increase and, hence, this leads
to conclude that both countries are worse o¤ with an increase in the
level of corruption. However, if the scal authority of country 1 is not
really concerned about public spending stabilisation (1 < ~1), a rise
in the degree of corruption causes a decrease in both the ination rate
and public spending of country 1 and an increase in the output rate of
country 1. This brings to the conclusion that, in this case, an increase
in the degree of corruption positively a¤ects both countries. Finally, for
intermediate values of 1 (i.e., ~1 < 1 < 1), the decrease in the public
spending of country 1 due to the increase in the level of corruption more
than compensates for the decrease in the ination rate and the increase
in output rate. In this case, we have that country 1 is worse o¤ with an
increase in the level of corruption, but country 2 is better o¤.
To sum up, Figure (4.2) represents the e¤ects of corruption on losses
in both countries in equilibrium.
Figure 4.2: Relationship between corruption and losses in equilibrium.
As indicated in Fig. 4.2, when the losses in country 2 increase in the
level of corruption and this holds when 1 > 1, the losses in country 1
also increase. However, when 1 < 1; the losses in country 2 decrease as
the level of corruption increases. In this range, corruption may increase
or decrease the losses in country 1. Therefore, we can see that there are
more cases where an increase in the level of corruption damages country
1 but benets country 2.
Note that, we can analyse how 1 may increase. This implies having
fewer cases in which both countries are worse o¤ with an increase in the
level of corruption.
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Remark. Notice that 1 increases if:
a) the degree of corruption increases,
b) the scal authority of country 1 is strongly concerned about its
output,
c) the public spending target of country 1 decreases, or
d) the output target of country 1 increases.
Roughly speaking, if one of the previous conditions is satised, the
government of country 1 is more interested in output stabilisation. This
makes it more likely that country 1 decreases its tax rate when the level
of corruption increases and, consequently, the ination rate decreases.
This means that 1 becomes higher.
4.3.1.1 Negative Externality and Compensation
The previous analysis suggests that country 2 may be negatively a¤ected
by corruption in country 1. To determine under which conditions corrup-
tion causes a harmful e¤ect on country 2, we study when the di¤erence
between the losses in country 2 under corruption and without corruption
is positive, i.e., L2()   L2(1) > 0:6 Combining the expression of the
losses in country 2 and Corollary 2, it follows that
L2()  L2(1) =
1
2

( ())2   ( (1))2 :
Hence, L2()  L2(1) > 0 if and only  () >  (1) : Using the Expres-
sion (4.11), it follows that corruption in country 1 generates a negative
externality in country 2 if and only if 1 > 1
(1+)x1+g1
g1
: In what fol-
lows, we assume that this inequality holds.7 In such a case, it could be
interesting to analyse how country 1 might compensate country 2 for
the increase in its losses. Notice that, for achieving this goal, policies
6L2() denotes the optimal losses of country 2 as a function of the degree of
corruption, : In particular, L2(1) means the optimal losses of country 2 without
corruption.
7As a possible extension, one might study corruption as a positive externality.
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that reduce ination would be e¤ective. By virtue of (4.11), we can con-
clude that the implementation of some austerity measures in country 1
could compensate country 2 for corruption. One easy way to model such
measures would be to require a reduction in the public spending target
of country 1.8 In this new framework, the scal authority of country 1
selects the tax rate that minimises the loss function of country 2, assum-
ing that now the public spending target is the required level of public
spending target of country 1, denoted by gR1 : The following corollary ex-
plicitly characterises the value of gR1 that fully compensates country 2 for
corruption:
Corollary 4. Country 2 is fully compensated for the negative ex-
ternality caused by country 1 (corruption) if gR1 = g1   	; where 	 =
(1  ) 1 1
(1+)x1+g1
g1
1+1
g1.
Notice that the expression of the reduction in the public spending
target of country 1, denoted by 	; suggests that when there is no cor-
ruption (i.e.,  = 1) or when the negative externality vanishes (i.e.,
1 = 1
(1+)x1+g1
g1
), this reduction is null.
Next, we wonder whether the present austerity measure harms or
benets country 1. To answer this question, we study the optimal losses
of country 1 as a function of the reduction in its public spending target,
denoted by L1 (	). Direct computations yield that
L1 (	) =
1
2
  
z
CCB
2 + 1
1
(x1 + g1  	) (4.16)
+ (1  z) CCB
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2)
!2
+1
 
1
1
x1    (g1  	)
2 + 1
1
  x1
!2
+ 1
 

  1
1
x1 +  (g1  	)
2 + 1
1
  g1
!21A ,
8A similar analysis could be performed assuming a reduction in the relative weight
associated to public spending of country 1.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON CORRUPTION, SEIGNIORAGE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. 
Judit Garcia Fortuny 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1678-2015
4. The E¤ects of Corruption in a Monetary Union 86
where L1 (	) indicates that country 1 is forced to have its required public
spending target.
Comparing the Expressions L1 (	) and L

1 (0), we can see that the
ination rate and the output deviation decrease in 	; while the pub-
lic spending deviation increases in 	. Thus, we can conclude that this
austerity measure, if adopted, will negatively a¤ect country 1 provided
that this country is su¢ ciently concerned about the stabilisation of pub-
lic spending (i.e., 1 is high enough). This result is formalised in the
following corollary:
Corollary 5. If the scal authority of country 1 is not really con-
cerned about public spending stabilisation ( 1 < b1), country 1 is better
o¤ with the required public spending target. By contrast, if the scal
authority of country 1 gives a high relative weight to public spending sta-
bilisation ( 1 > b1), this country is worse o¤ with such a measure.9
Suppose that 1 > b1. In this case, it would be interesting to study
(i) under which conditions country 1 would be willing to accept the aus-
terity measure and remain in the monetary union and, (ii) under which
conditions country 1 would reject the measure and, as a result, country 1
would exit the monetary union. To perform this analysis, we assume that
in case of leaving the monetary union the new central bank has similar
preferences to the initial common central bank. After some algebra, we
have that, if country 1 decides to leave the monetary union, the losses
are given by
LNM1 =
1
2
0@ CCB
2 + 1
1
(x1 + g1)
!2
(4.17)
+1
 
1
1
x1   g1
2 + 1
1
  x1
!2
+ 1
 

  1
1
x1 + g1
2 + 1
1
  g1
!21A ;
where the superscript NM refers to the fact that country 1 does not
remain in the monetary union.
9c1 is implicitly determined in the Appendix.
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Notice that country 1 has incentives to leave the monetary union if
and only if L1(	) > L
NM
1 . From the Expressions (4.16) and (4.17), it fol-
lows that ination rate is lower if country 1 decides to remain in the mone-
tary union provided that x2+g2
1+
2
2
is low enough

i.e., x2+g2
1+
2
2
< 
2+
1
1
 
x1 + g1 +
z
1 z	

,
the output deviation is lower if country 1 decides to remain in the mon-
etary union, while the public spending deviation is lower if country 1
chooses to leave the monetary union. This leads us to the following
conclusion:
Corollary 6. Country 1 benets from leaving the monetary union if
country 1 is very concerned about stabilising its public spending (i.e., 1
is high enough). However, the opposite result holds whenever ination is
lower if country 1 decides to remain in the monetary union and country
1 is highly concerned about this fact (i.e., 1 and
x2+g2
1+
2
2
are low enough).
4.3.1.2 The Greek Case
In the last years, news about the Greek crisis have drawn attention
around the world. Being aware that our model does not capture all
that is happening in Greece (such as debt, international trade, alternat-
ing right and left parties in o¢ ce, among others), our results may make
an interesting comparison with the current situation in Greece. Notice
that, according to the 2014 corruption perception index drawn up by
Transparency International, Greece is the most corrupt country in the
European Monetary Union. Further, the Troika (the European Central
Bank, the European Commission and the International Monetary Fund)
has recommended the implementation of scal consolidation measures
for Greece in order to receive a third bailout. One of these measures
includes a cut in its public spending.
There are two opposing opinions on the introduction of this measure.
Paul Krugman and Joseph E. Stiglitz recommend to reject these mea-
sures and leave the Eurozone, while Christopher Pissarides and several
Economics professors at Universities in Greece agree with these measures
and with the position of remaining in the Union. According to our model,
a cut in public spending could be interpreted as a lower public spending
target (see Table 4.1). Thus, Corollary 5 suggests that if Greece is not
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really concerned about public spending stabilisation, this country would
be better o¤ with a reduction in its public spending target. By contrast,
if Greece gives a high relative weight to its public spending stabilisation,
Greece is worse o¤ with its required target. In this last case, it would be
interesting to study if Greece has incentives to leave the EMU and, from
our study, Corollary 6 provides the following intuitions: if (i) Greece not
really concerned about its public spending stabilisation, (ii) the output
and public spending targets of other countries of the EMU are low, and
(iii) these last countries are very concerned about output stabilisation
(or not very concerned about public spending stabilisation), Greeces op-
timal decision would be to remain in the EMU. Otherwise, if Greece is
very concerned about stabilising its spending, Grexit from the Euro-
zone would be the optimal decision for Greece and, consequently, the
reduction in its public spending would not be implemented.
4.4 Conclusions
In this chapter, we have examined the e¤ects of corruption in a mone-
tary union with two countries. To do so, we have extended the model
of Hefeker (2010) to consider more asymmetry between countries, i.e.,
di¤erent preferences on the authoritiesobjectives and di¤erent output
target levels among countries. However, we have focused on the e¤ects of
corruption on both countries. Additionally, we model a monetary policy
game, where corruption negatively a¤ects tax revenue (as in Huang and
Wei, 2006) only in one country, and we obtain some interesting results.
First, we nd that as the degree of corruption rises, the public spend-
ing of country 1 always decreases and its output and the ination rate
may increase or decrease, depending on how far the scal authority of
country 1 is concerned about stabilising its public spending. Concretely,
if the degree of corruption increases and the scal authority of country
1 gives a high relative weight to public spending stabilisation, it raises
the tax rate. The rise in the tax rate increases the incentives to inate
by the central bank. By contrast, the opposite result may hold if the s-
cal authority of country 1 is not really concerned about public spending
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stabilisation. However, the output and public spending of country 2 are
not a¤ected by changes in corruption.
Second, we show that losses in both countries also depend on the
relative weight of public spending assigned by the scal authority of
country 1. Specically, if the scal authority of country 1 is not very
concerned about public spending stabilisation, corruption favours both
countries, whereas the reverse result may hold if the scal authority of
country 1 gives a high relative weight to public spending stabilisation.
Third, we argue that country 2 could require a reduction in the pub-
lic spending target of country 1 in order to make country 2 indi¤erent
about the externality from country 1. Additionally, if country 1 is forced
to decrease its public spending target, country 2 is always better o¤.
However, country 1 may be worse o¤ with this change if this country is
very concerned about stabilising its public spending. The case of Greece
is a good illustration of how a cut in public spending may a¤ect a corrupt
country. Greece, according to the corruption perception index, was the
most corrupt country in the European Monetary Union in 2014. This
country has been required to implement scal consolidation measures in
order to receive a third bailout. One of these measures consists in cutting
its public spending. According to our model, a cut in public spending
target favours Greece if the Greek government is relatively less interested
in stabilising its public spending. However, if Greece gives a high rela-
tive weight to its public spending stabilisation, Greece would be worse o¤
and, in this case, Grexitmight be a good decision. Concretely, if Greece
is relatively very interested in stabilising its public spending, leaving the
Eurozone may be an optimal decision.
Several extensions are left for future research. In order to illustrate
the e¤ect of corruption in one country on another country in a monetary
union. We started supposing that there is only one country with a cor-
rupted government. Once this analysis is made, an interesting extension
would be to consider two corrupt countries. This analysis could also be
extended to include seigniorage revenues as another source of nancing
for governments. Another extension would be to analyse the e¤ects of
corruption in a monetary union with a scal union.
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Appendix
Appendix A: Figure
Figure 4.3 illustrates the EMU and World Rankings. The rst position
means the cleanest country. By contrast, the last position is the most
corrupt country.
Figure 4.3: The Corruption Perception Index in the European Monetary
Union.
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Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Substituting the Expressions (4.1), (4.2) and
(4.3) into (4.4) and (4.5), it follows that
L1 =
1
2

2 + 1 (   e    1   x1)2 + 1 ( 1   g1)2

L2 =
1
2

2 + 2 (   e    2   x2)2 + 2 ( 2   g2)2

and
LCCB =
1
2

2 + CCB (z (   e    1)
+ (1  z) (   e    2)  (zx1 + (1  z) x2))2

:
The rst-order conditions of the scal authoritiesoptimisation problems
are given by
@L1
@ 1
=  1 (   e    1   x1) + 1 ( 1   g1) = 0 and
@L2
@ 2
=  2 (   e    2   x2) + 2 ( 2   g2) = 0:
Hence,
 1 =
g1

 
1
1


2 + 1
1
 (x1 + g1) + 11
2 + 1
1
(   e) and (4.18)
 2 = g2  
2
2
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2) +
2
2
1 + 2
2
(   e) : (4.19)
For the central bank, the rst-order condition of its optimisation prob-
lem implies that
@LCCB
@
=  + CCB (z (   e    1) + (1  z) (   e    2)
  (zx1 + (1  z) x2)) = 0:
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Thus,
 =
CCB
1 + CCB
(e + z ( 1 + x1) + (1  z) ( 2 + x2)) : (4.20)
Plugging the Expressions (4.18) and (4.19) into (4.20), it follows that
 =
z 
2
2+
1
1
+ (1  z) 1
1+
2
2

e + z

2 + 1
1


(x1 + g1) (4.21)
+ (1  z) 1
1 + 2
2


(x2 + g2) ;
where  = 1
CCB
+ z 
2
2+
1
1
+ (1  z) 1
1+
2
2
:
Using rational expectation hypothesis, we know that  = e: There-
fore, from the Expression (4.21), it follows that
 = z
CCB
2 + 1
1
(x1 + g1) + (1  z) CCB
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2) : (4.22)
Substituting the Expression (4.22) in (4.18) and (4.19), and after
some algebra, we obtain the Expressions (4.9) and (4.10).
Proof of Corollary 2. We di¤erentiate the expressions for the out-
put (4.12 and 4.13), public spending (4.14 and 4.15) and ination (4.11)
rates with respect to . Therefore, we obtain the following expressions:
@
@
x1 =  
2 1
1
x1 +

1
1
  2

g1
2 + 1
1
2 ,
@
@
g1 =
1
1

2   1
1

x1 + 2g1
2 + 1
1
2 ,
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON CORRUPTION, SEIGNIORAGE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. 
Judit Garcia Fortuny 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1678-2015
4. The E¤ects of Corruption in a Monetary Union 94
@
@
 = zCCB
2 1
1
x1 +

1
1
  2

g1
2 + 1
1
2 , and
@
@
x2 =
@
@
g2 = 0:
Hence, @
@
x1 > 0 and
@
@
 < 0 if and only if 1 > 1, where the expression
of 1 is given in the statement of this corollary. Finally, taking into
account the assumption that x1
g1
< 1
1
, we can conclude that @
@
g1 > 0.
Proof of Corollary 3. a) Substituting the Expressions (4.11), (4.12)
and (4.14) into (4.4) for country 1 and deriving the resulting expression
with respect to , we have
@L1
@
= 1
p(1) 
1 + 
21
3  2
2
+ 1
 ;
where
p(1) = p2
2
1 + p11 + p0; with
p2 =  

z (1  z)42CCBg1 (x2 + g2) + 3
 
z22CCB + 1
 
1 + 2
2

(x1 + g1) g1

;
p1 = 2z (1  z)312CCBx1 (x2 + g2)
+1
 
1 (x1   g1) + z22CCB (2x1 + g1)
 
1 + 2
2

(x1 + g1) and
p0 = z (1  z) 212CCB (2x1 + g1) (x2 + g2) + 31

1 + 2
2

(x1 + g1) x1:
Notice that p2 < 0 and p0 > 0: This allows us to guarantee that
there exists a unique positive root of the polynomial p(1); denoted by
~1: Hence, we can conclude that
@L1
@
< 0 if and only if 1 > ~1:Moreover,
in order to show that
1 > ~1 (4.23)
it su¢ ces to prove that p(1) < 0: Direct computations yield
p(1) =  231
1 + 2
g1
(x1 + g1)
3 < 0 and,
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hence, (4.23) is satised.
b) Taking into account that the output and public spending of country
2 are not a¤ected by the level of corruption of country 1, we have that
@L2
@
=  @

@
: Combining the positiveness of  and Corollary 2, it follows
that @L

2
@
< 0 if and only if 1 > 1:
Proof of Corollary 4. To study how can country 1 compensate
country 2 for its negative externality (corruption), we will take into ac-
count the Expression (4.4) for country 2. Therefore, in equilibrium
L2 =
1
2
0@ z CCB
2 + 1
1
(x1 + g1) + (1  z) CCB
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2)
!2
(4.24)
+
2
1 + 2
2
(x2 + g2)
2
!
:
Note that country 2 has the same losses whether there is corruption
or not if L2()  L2(1) = 0; this is equivalent to
1
2
( ())2   1
2
( (1))2 = 0:
Hence, the value of gR1 that satises the previous expression is given
by
gR1 = g1  	;
where the expression of 	 is given in the statement of this corollary.
Proof of Corollary 5. Using the expression of 	; we get that
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L1 (	)  L1 (0) =
1	
2 (1 + 1)
 
1 + 
21
2
(2 + 2)
l(1);
where
l(1) = (1  )3 (2 + 2) g131
+
  
(1  )2 1g1   (1 + ) z22CCBg1  
  
1  2 1 + 2z22CCBx1 (2 + 2)
 2z (1  z) 22CCB (x2 + g2)

21
 1
  
(1  ) ((1 + ) x1 + g1) 1 + z22CCB
  
1 + 2

x1 + (1 + ) g1

(2 + 2)
+2
 
1 + 2

z (1  z) 22CCB (x2 + g2)

1
 2z (1  z) 2122CCB (x2 + g2) :
Note that
l

1
(1 + ) x1 + g1
g1

< 0 and
lim
1!1
l(1) > 0:
Moreover, applying the Descartesrule, we can conclude that there ex-
ists a unique value of 1; denoted by b1; that satises L1 (	) L1 (0) = 0:
Moreover, we know that b1 2 1 (1+)x1+g1g1 ;1 : Therefore, if 1 < b1;
country 1 is better o¤ with its required public spending target. Other-
wise, if 1 > b1; country 1 is worse o¤ with its required target.
Proof of Corollary 6. Using the expression of 	; it follows that
the inequality L1(	) > L
NM
1 is equivalent to
2(1 )221g21
(1+21)(1+1)2

1   1 (1+)x1+g1g1
2
>
22CCB
2+
1
1
2 (x1 + g1)2  

z CCB
1+
1
1
(x1 + g1) + (1  z) CCB x2+g2
1+
2
2
2
:
Note that if 1 is high enough the previous inequality is satised and,
consequently, in this case country 1 prefers to leave the monetary union.
By contrast, if 1 = b1, then L1(	) = L1(0): It is easy to see that this
value is lower than LNM1 whenever
x2+g2
1+
2
2
< 
2+
1
1
(x1 + g1) :
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Chapter 5
Concluding Remarks
5.1 Summary of the Main Results
In the last two decades, cases of corruption have been unveiled in di¤er-
ent countries, raising public awareness and reinforcing a trend in which
society expects more from their leaders. This feature is prevalent in devel-
oping economies. However, developed countries also su¤er this problem
but it is less common than in many developing countries. Thus, develop-
ing countries rely more on getting nance through seigniorage revenues
and less through tax revenues. The concept of seigniorage refers to the
di¤erence between the face value of a note or coin and its costs of pro-
duction and mintage (Buiter, 2007). In order to develop a model that
is also applicable to developed economies, I have allowed for seigniorage
revenue to take di¤erent proportions.
I have incorporated corruption in the analytic models of this thesis
for the growing number of corruption scandals around the world. In this
thesis, corruption refers to the fact that the private sector pays taxes but
only a proportion is collected by the government (as in Huang and Wei,
2006) and seigniorage is modeled as the revenue from ination that it is
transferred from the central bank to public spending of each government
(as in Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1998; Hefeker, 2010).
This thesis has been mainly focused on two concepts: corruption
and seigniorage. Concretely, the central aim of this thesis has been to
analyse the e¤ects of corruption and seigniorage on some of the main
100
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macroeconomic objectives and on the conservativeness of the central bank
with a broader model than the ones proposed in the related literature. In
what follows, I present the key ndings and some suggestions for future
research.
There are four main results found in my thesis. The rst one is
how corruption and seigniorage a¤ect central bank conservativeness. On
the one hand, I have shown that if the degree of corruption increases,
the central bank should be less conservative when supply shocks are not
important. The reason of this result is that if corruption increases, the
resources available for the government through taxes decrease. Hence, the
scal authority needs to collect nancing resources through seigniorage
and then the central bank should be less conservative. By contrast, the
opposite result may hold when shocks are relevant. On the other hand,
the higher the degree of seigniorage, the less conservative the central
bank should be. Intuitively, if seigniorage increases, then the funding
available through seigniorage (taxes) becomes more (less) important. For
this reason, in contexts where the governments and societys preferences
coincide, the government (society) prefers to appoint a less conservative
central bank for the conduct of the monetary policy.
The second result is related to the impact of seigniorage on output
growth and the ination rates. I have found that when the degree of
seigniorage increases, the output growth rate always increases but the
ination rate can increase or decrease (depending on some parameter
values). Concretely, when the degree of seigniorage increases, seigniorage
revenue also increases. This allows the government to set a lower tax
rate, which has a positive e¤ect on output growth rate. The decrease in
the tax rate brings two e¤ects on the behaviour of the central bank. If
the central bank prioritises considerably more the stabilisation of output
over public spending, the central bank has less incentives to inate. By
contrast, if the central bank prioritises more the stabilisation of public
spending over output, the opposite result could be true.
The third result is linked to the e¤ect of corruption on output growth
and ination rates. I have studied this relationship in two frameworks.
First, I have focused on the case of one country where the government
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could benet from seigniorage revenue and the output target level is
zero. Second, I have analysed the e¤ects of corruption on two countries
in a monetary union where one country has a corrupt government, both
governments can only obtain nance through taxes, and output targets
for both governments may be not null. In both cases, I have found that
when an increase in corruption leads to a decrease in output growth rate,
then the ination rate increases. Moreover, if an increase in corruption
leads to a decrease in the ination rate, then output growth rate increases.
For the monetary union case, this result is only satised for the corrupt
country since, in our model, corruption has no e¤ect on output growth
rate for the other country. In addition, it is important to point out
that there is another possible result in the rst study case: an increase
in corruption could lead to an increase in both the output growth and
ination rates. This is due to the fact that an increase in corruption leads
to a decrease in the tax rate and, hence, output growth rate increases.
Moreover, if the central bank places a high relative weight on public
spending objective, the ination rate increases.
The fourth result is connected with the e¤ects of corruption on the
loss functions of both countries in a monetary union. Assuming that
the governments and societys preferences coincide, I have found that
if the scal authority of country 1 (with a corrupt government) is not
really concerned about public spending stabilisation, both countries are
better o¤ with an increase in corruption. However, if the scal authority
gives a high relative weight to public spending stabilisation, an increase
in corruption causes both countries to be worse o¤. As country 2 may be
negatively a¤ected by corruption in country 1, I have studied how country
1 might compensate country 2 for the negative externality. I have shown
that the implementation of austerity measures minimises the losses of
country 2. One easy way to model such measures has been to require
a reduction in the public spending target of country 1. In this case, I
have analysed if the reduction in the required spending target harms or
benets country 1. Concretely, I have found that if the scal authority
of country 1 is very concerned about public spending stabilisation, this
country is worse o¤ with such a measure. In this case, country 1 prefers
to reject the measure and to exit the union.
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5.2 Future Research
Of course, some potentially relevant considerations are not covered by
the analysis provided in this thesis and could signicantly alter the re-
sults presented. In the models developed in this thesis, authorities select
their instruments simultaneously and debt is not modeled. Therefore,
one possible extension could be that the government nances its debt
repayments. Thus, I could focus on debt dynamics as in Beetsma and
Bovenberg (1997). The government would control taxes, public spending
and public debt.
An interesting extension would be to study what happens with the
"eaten up" part of taxes on the economy. Moreover, an interesting pos-
sibility in chapter 4 would be that this fraction is sent to the output of
the other country.
Another avenue for future research would be to endogenise the de-
gree of corruption. The cost in ghting corruption could be modelled in
two di¤erent ways, as proposed by Hefeker (2010) and Dimakou (2013).
Hefeker (2010) assumes that the personal or political costs of ghting
corruption is considered in the loss function of the government. By con-
trast, Dimakou (2013) considers that these costs are in the governments
budget constraint. In this setup, the timing would be: (i) the govern-
ment sets corruption, (ii) rational expectations are formed, and (iii) the
government and central bank choose scal and monetary instruments.
The analytic models developed in this thesis have been carried out as
simultaneous games where all agents act like Nash players. Therefore, it
would be interesting to examine the framework where the decisions are
taken sequentially and, therefore, to study the properties of the Stack-
elberg equilibrium. There are two alternative ways to do this: the case
of monetary leadership and the case of scal leadership. This last case
seems more likely since monetary policy is adjusted more quickly than
scal policy.
Another interesting extension in this literature would be to empir-
ically estimate the parameters of the model and test the implications
presented here.
UNIVERSITAT ROVIRA I VIRGILI 
ESSAYS ON CORRUPTION, SEIGNIORAGE AND ECONOMIC POLICIES. 
Judit Garcia Fortuny 
Dipòsit Legal: T 1678-2015
5. Concluding Remarks 104
After analysing the possible extensions of this thesis, let me now focus
on some extensions for each chapter.
One possible extension in the second and third chapters would be
to include an output target as I incorporated in Chapter 4 and as in
Debelle and Fischer (1994). This feature would be another extension
of Huang and Wei (2006). In addition, for Chapter 2 and Chapter 3,
it could be interesting to incorporate the La¤er curve e¤ect in seignior-
age, as in Huang and Wei (2006). In this case, I would replace how I
model seigniorage revenues by the La¤er curve e¤ect. I could compare
the new e¤ects of seigniorage with the results obtained in Chapter 2 and
Chapter 3. Moreover, including an exogenous supply shock in the second
and fourth chapters would be relevant to consider since, from my knowl-
edge, no one in this literature has studied the e¤ects of corruption and
seigniorage in an economy with shocks.
Finally, the study of the corruption e¤ects in a monetary union, Chap-
ter 4, allows to extend the model in many ways. First, I could include
seigniorage as another source of revenue for the governments. I will
assume that governments get seigniorage revenues according to their rel-
ative share in the monetary union. Second, following Beetsma et al.
(2001) and Dixit and Lambertini (2003), I could study scal coordina-
tion in the monetary union. With scal coordination, governments would
minimise the collective losses. Third, I could explore how conservative
should the common central bank be as I analysed in Chapter 3. Fourth,
I could consider the case where both countries in the monetary union are
corrupt.
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